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INTRODUCTION
In 1999, Palm Beach County commissioners authorized an
eminent domain action against John and Wendy Zamecnik,1 taking the home that they had “fall[en] in love with” and “never
wanted to leave” after twenty years of ownership2 in return for
its fair market value3—the amount someone less connected to
the home would have been willing to pay. The purpose of the
eminent domain action was to build a golf course in a county
that “ha[d] more golf courses per capita than any county east of
the Mississippi River.”4 The low value of an additional golf
course is reflected in the subsequent events: the land sat vacant
as the county failed to follow through on the plan for a golf
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1
Thomas R. Collins, Evicted Homeowners Feel Betrayed over Failed Project, Palm
Beach Post 1A (Mar 15, 2005).
2
Stephen Deere and Andy Reid, College Pitches Hillcrest Plan: Apprehensive Residents Want to See Details (S Fla Sun-Sentinel, Sept 19, 2005), archived at
http://perma.cc/AD5T-QYU5.
3
The jury was instructed to consider the fair market value of the property. Jury
Instructions, Palm Beach County v Craigmiles, Civil Action No 99-3196, *7–8 (Fla Cir
filed Jan 25, 2002) (available on Westlaw at 2002 WL 34675392) (“The constitutional requirement of full compensation means that the landowner must be paid completely for
the whole loss resulting from the taking. In most cases, it will be necessary and sufficient to full compensation that the award constitute the fair market value of the property.”). The Zamecniks were also given a small allocation for moving expenses of $4,000.
See generally Verdict for Parcel Nos. 283 & 329, Palm Beach County v Craigmiles, Civil
Action No 99-3196 (Fla Cir filed Jan 25, 2002) (available on Westlaw at 2002 WL
34675377).
4
Dana Berliner, Public Power, Private Gain: A Five-Year, State-by-State Report Examining the Abuse of Eminent Domain *58 (Apr 2003), archived at http://perma.cc/2SJE-7EUM.
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course,5 and eventually, in 2006, the land was sold to a local
university at a substantial loss.6
The wastefulness in this example highlights the potential
value of an eminent domain compensation standard that, consistent with the indemnity principle, would make the owner
whole. Were county officials to know and pay the Zamecniks’
(presumably) high subjective value of their home, as opposed to
the constitutionally required7 compensation of its fair market
value, adding a golf course may have seemed less justified.8
However, determining exactly how much the Zamecniks valued
their property is difficult,9 and scholars have struggled to come
up with practical estimates in such situations.10 This Comment
proposes using a well-being-analysis approach to estimating the
subjective valuation of homes such as the Zamecniks’. Such an
approach involves measuring the effects of eminent domain takings on reported life-satisfaction levels through surveying individuals, including people like the Zamecniks, who are involved
in eminent domain.
The constitutional record in eminent domain jurisprudence
expresses a commitment to making individuals such as the
Zamecniks “whole”11 as part of paying just compensation under
the Fifth Amendment. However, federal law and the majority of
states offer only fair market value, which generally undercompensates takees.12 The Supreme Court has settled on fair market

5

See Collins, Evicted Homeowners, Palm Beach Post at 1A (cited in note 1).
See Palm Beach County, Florida: Single Audit Report; Fiscal Year Ended September 30, 2006 *104 (Palm Beach County Office of Financial Management and Budget),
archived at http://perma.cc/4V3U-XELV.
7
See Almota Farmers Elevator & Warehouse Co v United States, 409 US 470, 473–
74 (1973).
8
See Part II.A.
9
See Part II.B.
10 For a discussion of scholarly attempts to estimate subjective valuation, see Part
II.B. This Comment responds to a challenge in Professor Richard A. Epstein’s canonical
work on this topic, in which he defends the use of a 50 percent multiplier premium on fair
market value in the context of private-to-private takings based on the New Hampshire Mill
Act but concludes that “in these circumstances one should not demand perfect precision
because there is no way to provide it.” Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Private Property and
the Power of Eminent Domain 174–75 (Harvard 1985).
11 This is the concept of restoring an individual “to [her] original or rightful position,” and it includes the individual’s subjective value. Steven D. Smith, The Critics and
the “Crisis”: A Reassessment of Current Conceptions of Tort Law, 72 Cornell L Rev 765,
769–71 & nn 16, 22 (1987) (quotation marks omitted).
12 For an early discussion of this issue, see generally W. Harold Bigham, “Fair
Market Value,” “Just Compensation,” and the Constitution: A Critical View, 24 Vand L
6
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compensation because revealed-preference approaches to estimating the subjective valuation of homes are generally problematic,13 and approaches that ask individuals to valuate14 their
property subjectively provide incentives to lie. Courts use this
second-best solution primarily due to the lack of a practical way
to estimate subjective value.15 In addition, only a small minority
of states use adjustments to fair market value estimates to compensate for subjective value, and among those states there is
disagreement about what the proper adjustment is.16
The lack of a true indemnity principle is implicated by current
eminent domain controversies that focus on public use, and even
members of the Supreme Court have questioned the fairness of
this absence.17 The strong public reaction18 against the Court’s decision in Kelo v City of New London19 was notable, and at least one
scholar has argued that the strong reaction to economicdevelopment eminent domain is due in part to the “paltry compensation” to owners who are excluded from the “benefits of whatever
renewal (if any) it accomplished.”20 In fact, several justices in the
Rev 63 (1970) (examining how fair market value consistently undercompensates subjects
of eminent domain, often engendering public discontent with the system).
13 See Richard A. Epstein, The Use and Limits of Self-Valuation Systems, 81 U Chi
L Rev 109, 125 (2014).
14 As opposed to the value that an individual’s property could sell for in a fair market (the fair market value), the subjective value—in monetary terms—is the minimum
price that an individual would be willing to accept as compensation for the sale of her
property. See Thomas J. Miceli, The Economic Theory of Eminent Domain: Private Property, Public Use 58 (Cambridge 2011) (discussing subjective value from a supply and demand perspective).
15 See Part I.A.
16 See Part I.B.
17 See notes 124–25 and accompanying text.
18 The Economist reported that the Supreme Court’s decision in Kelo v City of New
London, 545 US 469 (2005), “has set off a fierce backlash that may yet be as potent as
the anti-abortion movement.” Hands Off Our Homes (The Economist, Aug 18, 2005), archived at http://perma.cc/BW83-4PV7. The underlying sentiment persisted even several
years later. In a 2009 survey on constitutional attitudes performed by Knowledge Networks for Harvard University and Columbia University, 83.5 percent of respondents indicated that they did not think eminent domain should be used to “transfer[ ] someone’s
property to private developers whose commercial projects could benefit the local economy.”
Stephen Ansolabehere and Nathaniel Persily, Field Report: Constitutional Attitudes Survey
*23, 61 (Knowledge Networks, July 14, 2010), archived at http://perma.cc/S4MJ-LX82.
19 545 US 469 (2005).
20 Eduardo Peñalver, “In Kind” Just Compensation (Concurring Opinions, July 14,
2006), archived at http://perma.cc/L683-CC7L. This interpretation that the reaction is in
part about the post–eminent domain distribution of surplus is consistent with the emphasis on the acquiring party’s profit that is present in the executive order issued by
President George W. Bush one year after the Kelo decision. The order committed to limit
eminent domain to cases in which “the taking is for public use” and is “not merely for the
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Kelo oral arguments were “bothered” by the undercompensation
concern that arises from paying only fair market value, with one
justice pointing out that such undercompensation occurs while a
private party profits at the original owner’s expense.21 Indeed,
the opinion itself acknowledged the “importan[ce]” of “questions
about the fairness of the [fair market value] measure of just
compensation” raised in the amicus briefs,22 indicating that the
time may be right to push for a reevaluation of the standard. As
such, among scholars, the Kelo decision has prompted calls for a
renewed look at the accepted compensation approach.23
Despite the seriousness of this problem and the ripeness for
a solution, there have been no proposals that workably estimate
the difference between an owner’s subjective valuation of her
property and the property’s fair market value based on similarly
situated individuals’ valuations24 (which this Comment refers to
as the “subjective-value premium”). The lack of a solution means
that, on average, two thousand (often underprivileged25) individuals per year in the United States are threatened with bearing
the cost of this difference, and that is counting only “filed or

purpose of advancing the economic interest of private parties to be given ownership.” Executive Order 13406, 3 CFR 235, 235.
21 During oral arguments in Kelo, Justice David Souter, for example, said: “[W]hat
bothered Justice Breyer I guess bothers a lot of us. And that is, is there a problem of
making the homeowner or the property owner whole? But I suppose the answer to that is
that goes to the measure of compensation which is not the issue here.” Transcript of Oral
Argument, Kelo v City of New London, Docket No 04-108, *49 (US Feb 22, 2005) (“Kelo
Transcript”). In addition, Justice Stephen Breyer pointed out that the takees “want to be
really not made a lot worse off, at least not made a lot worse off just so some other people
can get a lot more money.” Id at *50.
22 Kelo, 545 US at 489 n 21.
23 See, for example, Katrina Miriam Wyman, The Measure of Just Compensation,
41 UC Davis L Rev 239, 241–42 (2007) (pointing to the “renewed discussion that [Kelo]
has prompted about how much compensation governments should pay when they take
people’s homes through eminent domain” and how it has prompted “many proposals to
increase compensation for takings”).
24 Part II.B discusses two proposals that are problematic. While one could be quickly calculated, it would require both a revamping of the tax system to be accurate and a
significant reduction in taxes. The other falls prey to the endowment effect.
25 See Sandra Phillips and Marion R. Sillah, A House Is Not a Home: Effect of Eminent Domain Abuse on the Poor, African Americans, and the Elderly, 36 Housing & Socy
115, 130 (2009) (reporting that “[t]he data show that the practice of taking private property for urban development and redevelopment abuses the rights of the most vulnerable
citizens,” inflicting burdens on “the poor, African American and elderly citizens in our
communities”).
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threatened condemnations for private parties.”26 This Comment
argues that the Court’s acknowledgement of the problems with
fair market value and its apparent concern about undercompensation are an invitation to create a practical measurement that
is more accurate than fair market value. A well-being analysis,
which uses hedonic psychology to measure and collect data on
changes in people’s subjective well-being in response to various
events, could be applied to provide the workable solution that
Fifth Amendment jurisprudence requires. By using regressions
on individuals’ assessments of their own levels of happiness in
longitudinal surveys, hedonic psychology can assign a financial
value to intangible losses.27
The advances that a well-being analysis offers in valuation
techniques give courts an opportunity to deviate from the fair
market value measure of compensation. Such analysis has the
potential to render inapplicable the Supreme Court’s assumption underlying the current determination of fair market value
as just compensation. Specifically, a well-being analysis would
provide courts with an estimate of the hedonic costs of the owner’s displacement from a home for which she is paid only fair
market value, and it would assign these costs a monetary value
so that courts could add them to the fair market value of the
taken property. In addition, this approach can be used to assess
state laws that provide supra–fair market value compensation
and to inform future laws with the same aim.
This Comment provides a justification for this approach and
estimates the average subjective-value premium using the best
data source available. Part I summarizes the current state of the
law for increasing compensation above the fair market value at
both the state and federal levels, and it shows that there is room
in courts and state legislatures for a well-being-analysis approach to compensation. Part II situates a well-being-analysis
approach in the theoretical debate about the costs and benefits
of compensation above fair market value. It then shows how a
26 Berliner, Public Power, Private Gain at *2 (cited in note 4) (finding over ten
thousand documented “instance[s] of actual or threatened condemnation for private parties” within the five-year period from 1998 to 2002).
27 See, for example, Irina D. Manta, Hedonic Trademarks, 74 Ohio St L J 241, 268–
71 (2013) (proposing a calculation of the hedonic loss to consumers in terms of how they
experience goods to inform when confusion in the trademark context should be actionable);
Andrew J. Oswald and Nattavudh Powdthavee, Death, Happiness, and the Calculation of
Compensatory Damages, 37 J Legal Stud S217, S218 (2008) (suggesting methods of bereavement valuation using hedonic psychology).
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rigorous well-being-analysis approach addresses some of the
concerns that have been raised, and it helps assign a nonarbitrary lower-bound value. Part III provides the empirical results
of an estimate of the hedonic costs associated with being paid
only the fair market value for one’s home—results that are obtained by using data from the British Household Panel Survey
(BHPS), an eighteen-year longitudinal survey that covers over
eight thousand unique moves while surveying individuals about
their happiness levels before and after each move. The results in
Part III provide an example of a workable approach to estimating subjective value, providing empirical support for a multiplier
of 22 percent that should be applied to the fair market value for
compensation in eminent domain actions. As such, the results
not only vindicate the more widespread adoption of state-level
statutory multipliers but also suggest that courts may be able to
adopt a well-being-analysis approach to valuation.
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND: JUST COMPENSATION AND WELL-BEING
ANALYSIS UNDER CURRENT FEDERAL AND STATE LAW
The current approach to just compensation in eminent domain takings under US constitutional law avoids difficult calculations and errs on the side of undercompensation by using the
independently verifiable standard of fair market value.28 States,
on the other hand, have been more willing to compensate owners
above fair market value—but there is significant variation
across states in their assessments of the proper way to do so.
A.

“Just Compensation” as Fair Market Value: An
Undercompensating Compromise Born out of Empirical
Limitations

In Olson v United States,29 the Court noted that the Takings
Clause entitles the original property owner “to be put in as good
a position pecuniarily as if his property had not been taken,” as
“[h]e must be made whole.”30 At the same time, the Supreme
28

See notes 12–16 and accompanying text.
292 US 246 (1934).
30 Id at 254–55. See also United States v Miller, 317 US 369, 373 (1943) (“The owner
is to be put in as good position pecuniarily as he would have occupied if his property had
not been taken.”). But see Olson, 292 US at 255–56 (stating that compensation “is the
market value of the property at the time of the taking contemporaneously paid in money” and that “[c]onsiderations that may not reasonably be held to affect market value are
excluded”).
29
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Court has interpreted the just compensation requirement of the
Fifth Amendment to mean that “the owner is entitled to the fair
market value of his property at the time of the taking”31—though
the Court has also admitted that “[t]he term ‘fair’ hardly adds
anything to the phrase ‘market value.’” 32 Roughly speaking,33
fair market value is “what a willing buyer would pay in cash to a
willing seller.”34 This is true even when the value of the property
to the owner is based on elements that cannot be transferred:35
in such cases, the court considers only the “value transferable
from one owner to another.”36
These two commitments in the jurisprudence—to make individuals whole but also to compensate based only on fair market value—are in tension with each other. As Judge Richard
Posner has pointed out, the fair market value shows only the
value that the “marginal owner attaches to his property,” and
because the property owner may be “intramarginal,”
“[c]ompensation in the constitutional sense is therefore not full
compensation.”37 Indeed, a revealed-preferences argument shows
that the fair market value will be below the subjective value in
reasonably functioning real estate markets: an owner always
has the option of selling her property for the fair market value,
and the fact that she has not done so reveals that the value of
the property combined with the value of not having to move exceeds the property’s fair market value.38
One justification for the fair market value standard that
tracks the dicta in the cases is that the fair market value standard
31

Almota Farmers Elevator & Warehouse Co v United States, 409 US 470, 474 (1973).
Miller, 317 US at 374.
33 The nuances of how fair market value is calculated are outside the scope of this
Comment.
34 Almota Farmers, 409 US at 474, quoting Miller, 317 US at 374. See also City of
New York v Sage, 239 US 57, 61 (1915) (“[W]hat the owner is entitled to is the value of the
property taken, and that means what it fairly may be believed that a purchaser in fair
market conditions would have given for it.”); David L. Callies and Shelley Ross Saxer, Is
Fair Market Value Just Compensation? An Underlying Issue Surfaced in Kelo, in Dwight
H. Merriam and Mary Massaron Ross, eds, Eminent Domain Use and Abuse: Kelo in Context 137, 137 (ABA 2006).
35 For examples of nontransferables that are not included in fair market value—
such as idiosyncratic customizations, neighborhood goodwill, or pleasant memories associated with the home—see Part II.A.1.
36 Kimball Laundry Co v United States, 338 US 1, 5 (1949).
37 Coniston Corp v Village of Hoffman Estates, 844 F2d 461, 464 (7th Cir 1988)
(emphasis in original).
38 Lee Anne Fennell, Taking Eminent Domain Apart, 2004 Mich St L Rev 957, 963
(“Most property owners value their property above fair market value; if they did not,
they likely would have sold it already.”).
32
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is a compromise acknowledging both the practical difficulty in
ascertaining subjective valuations and the need for fairness.39 A
concern for practicality is evident even in the first case in which
the Supreme Court used the fair market value standard, which
the Court described as “readily estimated.”40 Concerns for administrative ease again showed up in subsequent cases in which
the Court defended the fair market value standard against
claims that it was not “just compensation.”41
The case that most directly discusses the Court’s understanding of this tension and of how fair market value is a necessary compromise is United States v 564.54 Acres of Land,42 in
which the eminent domain takee was a nonprofit organization
that operated summer camps. The takee demanded more than
the fair market value of the property, asking to be paid the
amount that it would cost to obtain “functionally equivalent
substitute facilities at a new site.”43 The Court rejected the argument that the takee must truly be made whole, on the ground
that doing so would have been impractical:
In giving content to the just compensation requirement of
the Fifth Amendment, this Court has sought to put the
owner of condemned property “in as good a position pecuniarily as if his property had not been taken.” However, this
principle of indemnity has not been given its full and literal
force. Because of serious practical difficulties in assessing
the worth an individual places on particular property at a
given time, we have . . . employed the concept of fair market
value to determine the condemnee’s loss. . . . [T]he Court
has acknowledged that such an award does not necessarily

39 See Wyman, 41 UC Davis L Rev at 252–53 (cited in note 23) (discussing this apparent contradiction and noting that “the Court has suggested that subjective indifference
is not a practical objective for takings compensation because it is nearly impossible for an
outsider to accurately determine how much an owner subjectively values his or her losses”).
40 Boom Co v Patterson, 98 US (8 Otto) 403, 408 (1878).
41 United States v Commodities Trading Corp, 339 US 121, 124–26 (1950) (accepting a fair market value of the current ceiling price that was not adjusted to include a retention value, because “[a] persuasive reason against the general rule . . . is the highly
speculative nature of proof to show possible future prices on which ‘retention value’ must
depend”). See also, for example, United States v Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co, 229
US 53, 80 (1913) (stating that the fact “[t]hat the property may have to the public a
greater value than its fair market value affords no just criterion for estimating what the
owner should receive,” and rejecting the additional value of the property—which the
owner wanted to include—as “altogether speculative”).
42 441 US 506 (1979).
43 Id at 508.
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compensate for all values an owner may derive from his
property.44
In contrast to the “serious practical difficulties” associated with
estimating individual worth, the Court stated that the fair market value was “readily discernible.”45 Indeed, one state supreme
court justice interpreted this case and the Fifth Amendment jurisprudence of using fair market value “even when fair market
value may not fully compensate the landowner” as an “attempt
to achieve a workable rule.”46
In Kimball Laundry Co v United States,47 Justice Felix
Frankfurter rejected a valuation of property based on a subjective approach in favor of fair market valuation because
[a]s opposed to such personal and variant standards as value to the particular owner whose property has been taken,
this transferable value has an external validity which
makes it a fair measure of public obligation to compensate
the loss incurred by an owner as a result of the taking of his
property for public use.48
Here, the Court rooted its defense of the fair market value
standard in its “external validity” and implicitly demonstrated a
concern with the validity of standards that consider personal
value to a particular owner. The fairness of the fair market value approach, therefore, is based on its greater “external validity”
compared to other methods, rather than on its ability to make
the individual owner whole.49
It is also worth noting that the Court has discussed exceptions to the general preference for using a fair market value approach. For example, in dicta, the Court has pointed to the fact
that when a fair market value approach “would result in manifest
injustice to owner or public, courts have fashioned and applied

44

Id at 510–11, quoting Olson, 292 US at 255 (citations omitted).
564.54 Acres of Land, 441 US at 511, 514.
46 Religious of the Sacred Heart of Texas v City of Houston, 836 SW2d 606, 618 (Tex
1992) (Cornyn concurring).
47 338 US 1 (1949).
48 Id at 5.
49 It is worth noting that, in the past, Canadian law included subjective valuation
in its determination of just compensation. Up until 1970, Ontario and the federal government of Canada determined compensation based on “value to the owner,” but they
eventually adopted a fair market value approach due in part to the difficulties in estimating subjective value. Jack L. Knetsch and Thomas E. Borcherding, Expropriation of
Private Property and the Basis for Compensation, 29 U Toronto L J 237, 238–39 (1979).
45
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other standards.”50 The cases that the Court cited here, however,
are largely consistent with fair market valuation, since they are
flexible as to when the fair market value is determined by disregarding certain components of that value at the time of the taking rather than rejecting the fair market value approach entirely.51 As such, the “manifest injustice” standard is best suited for
reducing compensation from the fair market value at the time of
the taking rather than justifying an increase due to high subjective valuation.
These cases demonstrate that the Court’s commitment to
fair market valuation, despite its failure to leave the owner
whole, is triggered by the lack of manageable approaches with
“external validity”52 that might be better in this respect. Especially in light of the Court’s concern about fair market value as
expressed in Kelo, these cases create an opportunity for a superior method of estimating subjective value—one that is not highly “speculative.”53 Such a method would disrupt the calculation
underlying the fair market value compromise. As argued below,
a well-being-analysis approach does exactly that: by offering a
workable way to estimate subjective value with external validation,54 it allows courts to come closer to making owners whole. It
thus better coheres with the principles underlying just compensation jurisprudence without introducing significant accuracy
costs.
B.

State Provisions for Supra–Fair Market Value
Compensation

While the majority of states follow the federal approach and
accept the fair market value as just compensation,55 some states
50

Commodities Trading Corp, 339 US at 123.
See Miller, 317 US at 372–77 (finding that, although a declaration of taking was
filed by the Government in December 1938, the jury instructions to consider “market
value at the date of the taking, excluding therefrom any increment of value accruing after August 26, 1937,” were acceptable to avoid the Government’s paying for an “increase
in value . . . aris[ing] from speculation”); Olson, 292 US at 253–55, 261 (disregarding “elements of value arising from the prospect that the Government would acquire the flowage easements,” and effectively moving back the time of assessment of market value, as
“[u]nder the circumstances, intention to acquire was the equivalent of the formal designation of the property to be taken”).
52 Kimball Laundry, 338 US at 5.
53 Chandler-Dunbar Water Power, 229 US at 80.
54 See Part II.C.
55 See, for example, Ala Code § 18-1A-172 (“The fair market value . . . shall be defined as the price the property would bring when offered for sale by a willing seller who
51
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require that individuals be paid more than the fair market value
when eminent domain is pursued by state and local entities. In
eminent domain actions initiated by state and local governments, compensation must meet the standard that applies under
the Fifth Amendment—but these actions are also constrained by
state and local statutes,56 which occasionally provide additional
just compensation requirements. In some states, supra–fair
market value compensation is done through a fair market value
multiplier. For example, in Indiana57 and Rhode Island,58 in addition to paying the fair market value, the purchaser must pay a
50 percent multiplier of that fair market value plus the costs related to the transfer of ownership and to relocation. Similarly, in
Connecticut,59 Michigan,60 and Missouri,61 the floor for compensation in a taking of an individual’s principal residence is 125
percent of the property’s fair market value. In the case of a
property that has been in the owner’s family for fifty years or
longer, Missouri adds “heritage value,” which is 50 percent of
the fair market value, to the fair market value.62 This variation
raises the question of which state multiplier is more consistent
with the average subjective-value premium.
The majority of states that authorize compensation in excess of fair market value focus on expenses that do not show up
in fair market value but that seem easier to measure than subjective value. California,63 Illinois,64 Louisiana,65 Maryland,66
is not forced to sell and which is sought by a willing buyer who is not required to buy.”);
State v Alaska Continental Development Corp, 630 P2d 977, 991 (Alaska 1980) (confirming that the law in Alaska on condemnation appraisals is that fair market value is the
“appropriate measure” of just compensation).
56 See Ilya Somin, The Grasping Hand: Kelo v. City of New London and the Limits
of Eminent Domain 3 (Chicago 2015).
57 Ind Code Ann § 32-24-4.5-8 (imposing a 150 percent multiplier for residential
property, as well as a 125 percent multiplier for farmland).
58 RI Gen Laws § 42-64.12-8.
59 Conn Gen Stat Ann § 8-129(a)(2) (stating that “the compensation for any real
property to be acquired by eminent domain . . . shall be one hundred twenty-five per
cent” of the average of two independent appraisals of the land).
60 Mich Const Art X, § 2.
61 Mo Rev Stat §§ 523.001(3), 523.039.
62 Mo Rev Stat §§ 523.001(2), 523.039.
63 Cal Gov Code Ann § 7262.
64 735 ILCS 30/10-5-62.
65 La Rev Stat Ann § 19:9. See also City of Baton Rouge/Parish of East Baton
Rouge v Broussard, 834 S2d 665, 667–68 (La App 2002) (referring to the language in the
Louisiana statute and finding that “the cost of relocation, inconvenience and loss of profits is compensable under this provision”).
66 MD Real Prop Code Ann § 12-205.
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Massachusetts,67 Mississippi,68 Tennessee,69 and West Virginia70
require the payment of a takee’s relocation expenses. Minnesota
requires that just compensation for a person displaced by a taking be sufficient “to purchase a comparable property in the
community,” which under certain circumstances may significantly exceed the fair market value of the condemned property.71
In Michigan, an individual can claim “compensation for damage
caused by the taking, apart from the value of the property taken.”72 Connecticut law sets up a fund for relocation expenses.73 In
addition to these state laws, state and local projects that receive
federal funds must comply with the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970,74 which
requires them to provide relocation assistance in cases of eminent domain acquisitions.75
The variation in compensation levels across states is significant, and the more common approach of covering relocation expenses could be based on the same discomfort that the Court has
exhibited with the fuzziness of estimating subjective value. A
well-being analysis might encourage a state legislature eschewing a multiplier to reconsider this assessment, and it might help
identify which of the existing state multipliers comes closest to
making takees whole.

67

Mass Gen Laws Ann ch 79A, § 7.
Miss Code § 43-39-7.
69 Tenn Code Ann § 29-16-114.
70 W Va Code § 54-3 (requiring that the federal coverage of relocation expenses provided under certain circumstances in the Surface Transportation and Uniform Relocation Assistance Act of 1987 apply in state eminent domain actions).
71 Minn Stat § 117.187. See also County of Dakota v Cameron, 839 NW2d 700, 704–
05, 712 (Minn 2013) (affirming the district court’s award of damages in the amount of
$997,055.84 under Minn Stat § 117.187, even though the plaintiff’s condemned property
was appraised at no more than $560,300).
72 Mich Comp Laws § 213.55(5)(3)(a).
73 Conn Gen Stat §§ 8-266 to -268; Conn Agencies Regs § 8-273-13. Moving costs
are included as part of the value of the property. See Stanley Works v New Britain Redevelopment Agency, 230 A2d 9, 17–18 (Conn 1967) (finding that, for determining fair market value, “[o]ne factor which a trier may consider is the expense an owner is compelled
to incur in moving machinery from the condemned property to another location,” but not
counting it under the circumstances because the plaintiff had completed the move prior
to the taking and thus the “moving cost could not be considered as a factor affecting the
property’s value”).
74 Pub L No 91-646, 84 Stat 1894, codified as amended at 42 USC § 4601 et seq.
75 42 USC §§ 4621–38.
68
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Consistency of Well-Being Analysis with Other Areas of
the Law

This Comment proposes the use of a well-being-analysis approach to respond to the Supreme Court’s invitation for a rigorous estimation of subjective valuation. Thus, it is worth examining the extent to which such a well-being analysis, in which
reports of subjective well-being are used to estimate damages, is
similar to currently accepted valuation methods in legal analysis.
It is easier to understand what a well-being analysis would
look like outside of the eminent domain context. Perhaps the
clearest example of such an analysis is in the recent call for using “happiness regression” well-being analyses to calculate compensatory damages in wrongful death suits,76 as well as in
wrongful injury suits in response to injuries causing disability.77
In the former setting, a longitudinal data set that included lifesatisfaction metrics reflecting both how happy an individual was
at a given point in time and factors that one would generally expect to influence happiness was the source for the well-being estimates.78 Professors Andrew Oswald and Nattavudh Powdthavee
calculated damages for the death of a loved one by using regressions of these factors and whether there was a death in the family against the reported happiness levels before and after the
loss.79 In the disability setting, a similar regression analysis on
the same data set testing for how the loss of limbs affected happiness demonstrated that the happiness effects of disabilities
are relevant to damages for pain and suffering in cases involving
disabilities.80 In both of these studies, the authors proposed that
the traditional goal of tort law of making the plaintiff “whole”
can be met by estimating the negative effect on happiness
caused by the type of events in question and by then converting
that effect into monetary terms.81

76

Oswald and Powdthavee, 37 J Legal Stud at S220 (cited in note 27).
See Andrew J. Oswald and Nattavudh Powdthavee, Does Happiness Adapt? A
Longitudinal Study of Disability with Implications for Economists and Judges, 92 J Pub
Econ 1061, 1067 (2008).
78 See Oswald and Powdthavee, 37 J Legal Stud at S223–26 (cited in note 27).
79 Id at S220.
80 See Oswald and Powdthavee, 92 J Pub Econ at 1071 (cited in note 77) (“[T]he
general idea remains one that may eventually have practical application for lawyers and
judges: happiness equations potentially give a way of estimating the sums of money required to compensate people for bad life events.”) (emphasis added).
81 Oswald and Powdthavee, 37 J Legal Stud at S218, S220 (cited in note 27); Oswald
and Powdthavee, 92 J Pub Econ at 1071 (cited in note 77).
77
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The calls in these articles for the use of happiness regressions within legal cases have not resulted in actual damages calculations, but considering average hedonic impacts for the purpose of valuation is legally permissible. Perhaps the clearest
case establishing this is Sherrod v Berry,82 in which the court
considered the admissibility of expert testimony that allowed a
jury to consider the “hedonic value of a human life” in estimating damages related to the lost companionship between a father
and a son upon the death of the son.83 The court allowed testimony from an expert witness who cited a study showing that the
hedonic value of a life could be calculated by applying a multiplier to the deceased individual’s expected earnings.84 While the
jury had the right to reject such evidence, this case establishes
the potential value of hedonic approaches in helping to value
goods that do not have a market value.
While the expert was not offering a happiness regression
(the inference of value is from consumption decisions85 and survey data about willingness to pay86), the method of analysis does
have some similarities to a happiness regression. First of all, the
article cited by the expert relied in part on surveys in which individuals needed to self-assess,87 and thus the value was not
simply inferred from individual actions. In addition, like wellbeing analyses, the potential multipliers that were provided attempted to assign a value to a good that did not have a market
value. Finally, aggregate data from other individuals were used to
infer the value for one individual that could be applied through a
multiplier. In addition to the existence of these similarities, the
calculation of emotional impacts is generally left to the jury’s
discretion, with little guidance for valuation techniques.88 Thus,
82

629 F Supp 159 (ND Ill 1985), revd on other grounds, 856 F2d 802 (7th Cir 1988).
Sherrod, 629 F Supp at 160.
84 Id at 163 (discussing how the expert referenced fifteen economics studies discussing the value of life and also cited a metastudy finding that “there was a relationship
somewhere in the dimension of three times up to 30 times their economic productive income” as an estimate of “the hedonic value of life”). The cited study surveys academic
literature “estimat[ing] the theoretically relevant value of life which is one based on individual willingness to pay rather than some calculation of future earnings.” Glenn
Blomquist, The Value of Human Life: An Empirical Perspective, 19 Econ Inquiry 157,
158–62 (1981).
85 See Blomquist, 19 Econ Inquiry at 159 (cited in note 84).
86 See id at 158–59.
87 Id at 159–60 (describing the two studies involved as “seek[ing] to determine a
value of life by asking people how much they will pay”).
88 See Mark Geistfeld, Placing a Price on Pain and Suffering: A Method for Helping
Juries Determine Tort Damages for Nonmonetary Injuries, 83 Cal L Rev 773, 777, 841
83
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although no opinions have cited a well-being analysis for calculating damages, such evidence appears to be admissible given
the substantial latitude within the law for hedonic approaches
and given the estimate’s similarity to the estimates provided in
analyses of the hedonic value of life.
II. WELL-BEING ANALYSIS AS AN ATTRACTIVE APPROACH TO JUST
COMPENSATION
This Part establishes why a well-being analysis is a necessary and well-suited response to the tension between making an
individual whole and the need for workable standards that inheres in the just compensation jurisprudence.
There are many reasons that an individual might value her
home at more than its fair market value,89 and scholars have argued that ignoring this difference leads to inefficiencies and injustices.90 These reasons are discussed in Part II.A. Though the
Court has provided only a sketch of alternative approaches to
just compensation and the difficulties in their execution, there is
a substantial body of literature specifically regarding eminent
domain takings that aims to provide a basis for supra–fair market value compensation. Part II.B covers these approaches as
well as some of their limitations. While these approaches fall
prey to valuation concerns, a well-being analysis that uses individual happiness levels after a move in an attempt to estimate a
subjective-value premium can take into account many of these
concerns and still provide robust value estimates, consistent
with the Court’s compromise. Covering these benefits of a wellbeing analysis, Part II.C argues that such an approach can
make compensation in the context of eminent domain actions
more efficient and just.

(1995) (noting that “[s]tudies have shown that jury awards for pain and suffering vary
widely for injuries that appear to be equally severe” and that “[t]his lack of uniformity
introduces an element of unpredictability into the tort system,” but also noting that,
“[n]evertheless, jurors are not presently provided with the guidance that would help
them to understand how injury severity should be translated into a monetary award”).
89 See Fennell, 2004 Mich St L Rev at 963–64 (cited in note 38).
90 See, for example, Abraham Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky, Taking Compensation Private, 59 Stan L Rev 871, 877–85, 890 (2007) (surveying “competing theories [that]
have been proposed to explain [the] purpose and scope [of just compensation],” including
“fairness-based justifications” and “efficiency-based justifications,” and concluding that
“fairness and efficiency theories require payment of full compensation at the property
owner’s value in those cases where compensation is warranted”).
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A.

Why Supra–Fair Market Value Compensation Is a Better
Approach, and the Source of the Practical Problems

An owner’s subjective valuation of her home is likely to exceed its fair market value due to customizations based on the
homeowner’s preferences, intangibles associated with the home
that cannot be transferred (such as memories), and relocation
costs. The fair market value standard thus invites allocative inefficiencies.91 Part II.A.1 covers some of the nontransferable aspects of a home that can cause subjective valuation to be higher
than the home’s fair market value, and Part II.A.2 explains why
these aspects matter.
1. Reasons why subjective value might exceed the fair
market value.
It is a well-accepted fact that a homeowner may have a subjective value of her home that exceeds its fair market value.92
There are many factors that might drive a wedge between the
total value that an individual places on her home and her
home’s fair market value.
One source of this subjective value is the idiosyncratic customizations that individuals make to their homes. In the United
States, home renovations represent a substantial cost to homeowners,93 and many of these renovations will have much more
value to the residents than they will ever have in resale value.
On average, a homeowner will recoup less than $0.67 for every
$1.00 she spends on home-improvement projects.94 This makes
sense because homeowners spend money on making their houses
consistent with their individual preferences, and future buyers
are likely to have different preferences and to either value the
improvements less or make other renovations that are consistent with their own tastes. The combination of the large
amount spent on improvement projects and their low market
91 The term “allocative inefficiencies” refers to the utility that is lost when property
is transferred from higher-value to lower-value users.
92 For an early statement of this idea, see Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of
Public Use, 72 Cornell L Rev 61, 83 (1986) (observing that owners may place on their
properties “subjective premium[s]” that are above fair market value).
93 See Kris Hudson, Americans Boost Spending on Remodeling (Wall St J, Feb 3,
2014), archived at http://perma.cc/5E6G-8AUS (citing data from the US Census Bureau
indicating that in 2013, homeowners spent $130 billion on remodeling projects).
94 Erica Christoffer, 2013-14 Cost vs. Value: Remodeling Pays Off Big Time
(REALTOR Magazine, Jan 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/7LKT-VSFF (citing a “nationwide cost-value average of 66.1 percent” in a survey covering thirty-five projects).
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value returns suggests that there is a large gap between the
subjective value of homes and their fair market value.
Perhaps the most well-known source of the subjective value
of a home that is not part of the fair market valuation is the
memories that the owner associates with the home. Happy
memories are an example of a component of subjective valuation
that is much more difficult to valuate because they are intangible and inalienable. A divergence between the subjective and
fair market values can occur because memories cannot be transferred to a buyer.95 Professor Lee Fennell aptly compares the
subjective valuation of a home to that of a used wedding ring:
Even though there is a market for used wedding rings, created
by some individuals who sell their rings to raise cash quickly,
these individuals are likely not those with sentimental attachments to their rings. It would be incorrect to use the price at
which they sell their rings to estimate the value that a more
sentimental person—who has chosen not to sell—has when she
puts on her wedding ring.96 Another source is the lost goodwill
that occurs when an individual moves out of her neighborhood.97
Being forced to move means having to start all over again in establishing relationships with neighbors.
Finally, the relocation costs of moving to a new home are also
part of an individual’s subjective value of her home.98 Moving has
substantial costs99 that may not be encapsulated in the fair market value of the property. A homeowner’s value of her home includes her valuation of not having to move—indeed, some individuals may choose to buy a home rather than rent because they
do not want to live subject to the whim of a landlord who can
choose not to renew a lease. This value will not be priced into the

95 See Lee Anne Fennell, Just Enough, 113 Colum L Rev Sidebar 109, 112 (2013)
(arguing that such characteristics are nontransferable and are unlikely to be included in
the fair market value).
96 Id at 114.
97 See Merrill, 72 Cornell L Rev at 83 (cited in note 92). Note that while the topic of
lost business goodwill is relevant for eminent domain involving businesses, it is outside
the scope of this Comment because happiness surveys cannot be administered to assess
corporate well-being.
98 Id.
99 See generally, for example, Jeanne M. Brett, Job Transfer and Well-Being, 67 J
Applied Psychology 450 (1982) (examining the strain that moving may place on relationships); Sally Ann Shumaker and Daniel Stokols, Residential Mobility as a Social Issue
and Research Topic, 38 J Soc Issues 1 (Fall 1982) (offering an overview of mobility’s impact on both family-specific and national well-being).
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home,100 and thus part of the subjective valuation of a home is
the moving cost saved by staying there.
2. Arguments for including “something more,” and some
responses.
As demonstrated in this Part, economic theory and distributive justice theory converge in establishing the relevance of subjective valuation for eminent domain takings. Economists point
to the inefficiencies that result from the misallocation that can
occur under eminent domain if undercompensation is systemic.
Others reach the same conclusion about the need for subjective
valuation by pointing to the deep dignitary harms present when
one is paid only the fair market value for her property. Both approaches weigh in favor of considering subjective value.
The economic costs of using the fair market value standard
occur when land moves to a lower-value user.101 Allocative efficiency requires that no good be transferred from a user who values it more to a user who values it less. But fair market value
compensation does not guarantee such a result. Under fair market value compensation, proposed eminent domain takings that
meet the standard for public use will be incentivized if
Value of Home to Taker > Fair Market Value.
However, the fact that the individual has not moved implies that
Value of Home to Owner > Fair Market Value,
and there is no reason to infer that the owner’s value is lower
than the taker’s value. Thus, there is no guarantee that the taker’s valuation is higher than the owner’s valuation of the property—while this may be true in some cases, it need not necessarily

100 This is because in well-behaved property markets, one would expect investment
buyers to be the marginal purchasers. Such buyers may purchase in order to rent the
property out to others, with the result that the premium for getting to avoid the inconvenience of moving costs will not be part of the housing price since the house is a rental.
See Fennell, 2004 Mich St L Rev at 963 (cited in note 38) (considering “the out-of-pocket
cost of moving to another place” to be a component of subjective value that “do[es] not
enhance fair market value”).
101 At times, this Comment discusses the possibility of eminent domain as if a private actor were using it to reach the property of another. This is because, at least in theory,
private parties may be able to take advantage of eminent domain. See, for example,
Southwestern Illinois Development Authority v National City Environmental, LLC, 768
NE2d 1, 10 (Ill 2002) (finding that the “condemnation clearly was intended to assist [a private entity] in accomplishing their goals in a swift, economical, and profitable manner”).

2016]

Pinning Down Subjective Valuations

963

be true.102 Here, the cost of the taking is not fully internalized by
the taker because the taker pays less than the cost imposed to the
owner by eminent domain.103 Such a standard therefore invites
allocative-efficiency concerns,104 especially when one considers the
municipal-finance incentives that may make it possible for a government to purchase property even when the property’s value to
the municipality is below its fair market value.105
This is not to say that a world where eminent domain takings are not allowed in the first place is more efficient: absent
such takings, one must worry about strategic holdouts.106 The
economic literature has well established the fact that strategic
holdouts can keep property from being transferred even when
Value of Home to Taker > Value of Home to Owner,
because the property owner will try to extract all the surplus
that will come from the taker’s use of the property.107 An impasse could occur due to diverging estimates of each party’s bargaining power and due to the strategic behavior of each party in
trying to hold out to be the last seller and to extract the total
value from the buyer. However, one cannot expect fair market

102 For a similar discussion concluding that the use of eminent domain with a fair
market value standard may lead to allocative inefficiencies, see Thomas S. Ulen, The
Public Use of Private Property: A Dual-Constraint Theory of Efficient Governmental Takings, in Nicholas Mercuro, ed, Taking Property and Just Compensation: Law and Economics Perspectives of the Takings Issue 163, 169–71 (Kluwer Academic 1992).
103 For an argument about the importance of internalizing costs and its centrality to
the law, see Robert D. Cooter and Ariel Porat, Getting Incentives Right: Improving Torts,
Contracts, and Restitution 61–68 (Princeton 2014).
104 It is worth noting that at least one economist who has defended the fair market
value approach argues that such distortions need to be weighed against the incremental
distortions that would be caused by the increase in taxes required to fund the gap between fair market value and subjective value. See Richard Posner, Economic Analysis of
Law 65 (Aspen 5th ed 1998) (“[A] requirement of paying just compensation implies higher taxes (or tax substitutes such as inflation or public debt) than if there were no such
requirement; and taxes . . . create misallocative effects.”).
105 See, for example, William A. Fischel, The Political Economy of Public Use in
Poletown: How Federal Grants Encourage Excessive Use of Eminent Domain, 2004 Mich
St L Rev 929, 953 (arguing that “[a]bove-market compensation [ ] did not address the
essential problem of the Poletown takings”—namely, “that Detroit did not have to put up
much of its own money (either from its own taxes or from fungible grant money) to do the
Poletown project”).
106 See Miceli, The Economic Theory of Eminent Domain at 27–35 (cited in note 14).
107 See Thomas W. Merrill, Book Review, Rent Seeking and the Compensation Principle, 80 Nw U L Rev 1561, 1570 (1987) (noting that eminent domain “traditionally has
been employed to promote a more efficient allocation of resources by overcoming holdouts
and free riders”).
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value compensation through eminent domain to always generate
efficient allocations in resolving this holdout problem.
Scholars have reached the same conclusion by pointing to
the inherent injustice of compensation that is for only the fair
market value of the property in the context of eminent domain.
This approach is apparent in Professor Epstein’s classic work
Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain.108
Another example of this approach is the argument advanced by
Professor Rachel Godsil and attorney David Simunovich, who
argue that the undercompensation engendered by fair market
value means that some will not be able to purchase another home,
leading to the “loss of one’s status as a homeowner.”109 Finally, the
concern about the fundamental injustice of takers getting windfall gains while owners are undercompensated can play an important role in arguments that compensation should reflect some
of the surplus generated through eminent domain.110
One important response to both the efficiency and the fairness concerns is Professor Nicole Garnett’s argument that takers
may have incentives to avoid taking properties from owners with
high subjective values and that potential takers may bargain to
pay more than the eminent domain takings amount, meaning
that the inefficiencies of the fair market value standard may be
overstated.111 Garnett argues that because of the political consequences, takers are likely to avoid seeking high-subjective-value
properties that are “important to a cohesive community of politically powerful owners.”112 As she admits, however, this channel is
unlikely to protect groups who are traditionally considered politically powerless, and thus undercompensation still remains a

108

Epstein, Takings at 182–84 (cited in note 10).
Rachel D. Godsil and David Simunovich, Just Compensation in an Ownership
Society, in Robin Paul Malloy, ed, Private Property, Community Development, and Eminent Domain 133, 134 (Ashgate 2008).
110 See, for example, Michael Heller and Rick Hills, Land Assembly Districts, 121
Harv L Rev 1465, 1477–78, 1480 (2008) (discussing how the Supreme Court’s approach
to compensation is an “apparent injustice,” as “failure to pay over some share of the assembly value to condemnees deprives them of value that landowners normally retain,”
while ultimately arguing that in the land-assembly context, “if different procedures could
gauge subjective valuation more cheaply and effectively, there is little doubt that such
procedures would be more just”).
111 Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Neglected Political Economy of Eminent Domain, 105
Mich L Rev 101, 104–05 (2006).
112 Id at 118. See also id at 114–15 (discussing how plans for a Chicago expressway
were changed three times to avoid disrupting the parish boundaries of a particularly
large Polish Catholic church).
109
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concern.113 In addition, Garnett argues that potential takers may
wish to avoid the legal costs associated with the eminent domain
process, providing an example of a 2000 economic-development
project in South Bend, Indiana, in which the owners were paid by
AM General, on average, 141 percent of the appraised value of
their properties—an amount that included relocation assistance.114
While the point that sometimes individuals may receive more
than fair market value compensation is well taken, the particular
pressures in that situation—such as time pressure115 and the desire to maintain good relations with the community116—may not
always be present. As Garnett admits, “[her] case study does
not, and cannot, demonstrate how the precondemnation bargaining process works in every case.”117 One can find at least one example in which the initial compensation dynamics went in the
opposite direction, and it occurred in what is arguably the most
famous eminent domain case—Kelo. The developer in that case
initially offered Susette Kelo, the named plaintiff, an amount
less than the fair market value of her house, with the agent
warning that the developer would take the house using eminent
domain if Kelo did not accept the offer.118 Similarly, in one of the
more recent studies comparing compensation levels to the fair
market value, Professor Yun-chien Chang found that the median
compensation for residential properties was 88 percent of the estimated fair market value,119 implying that overcompensation is
not necessarily more likely than undercompensation. There may
be reasons to be particularly concerned about homeowners with
little bargaining power: as Garnett herself admits, “[o]wners
113 Id at 120–21 (discussing how, with the same expressway, the rerouting was at
the expense of those with less power and concluding that “[t]his troubling history serves
as a reminder that, while Taker-avoidance may minimize the overall undercompensation
problem, the risk of undercompensation persists in individual cases, especially when the
would-be targets lack political clout”).
114 Id at 130–36.
115 See Garnett, 105 Mich L Rev at 131 (cited in note 111).
116 See id at 131–32.
117 Id at 135.
118 See Jeff Benedict, Little Pink House: A True Story of Defiance and Courage 67
(Grand Central 2009). Kelo had estimated the fair market value of her house to be at
least $70,000, stating at one point: “How many people with a $70,000 house have a view
like this?” But she was initially offered only $68,000. Id at 131. While she ultimately received $442,000 for her lot after the Supreme Court’s decision, this high amount was due
to the desire of Connecticut officials to settle quickly and avoid further publicity. See id
at 373–74; Somin, The Grasping Hand at 233 (cited in note 56).
119 Yun-chien Chang, Private Property and Takings Compensation: Theoretical
Framework and Empirical Analysis 111–12, 130 (Edward Elgar 2013).
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have little incentive to ask for more than market value if they
realize that they will not get it.”120 Moreover, in the case that
Garnett discusses, the higher compensation was part of a larger
plan to cover relocation expenses, rather than having homeowners individually bargain for such coverage in the first
place.121 Thus, while these dynamics show that some factors can
lessen the degree of undercompensation, they will not apply in
all cases, and the resulting disparate impact may be particularly
disturbing.
Even if the percentage of cases in which undercompensation
occurs is low, the problems arising from undercompensation are
exacerbated by the increased use of eminent domain for nontraditional public purposes. Epstein has written extensively
about this problem. His concerns focus on narrow interests becoming richer through takings at the expense of a few landowners, which is why he has emphasized the importance of dispersing the benefits of takings.122 As discussed above,123 one can
conceive of an eminent domain action as imposing an externality
arising from the fact that the taker does not fully internalize
eminent domain’s cost to the owner. Limits on the extent to
which the benefits of such projects are concentrated can help reduce the externality problem by minimizing the difference between the benefits and the actual costs. Indeed, this tension between undercompensation and a broader definition of public use
may be behind the strong public reaction against Kelo, as mentioned in the Introduction. Identifying one of the main issues in
the oral arguments, Justice Breyer pushed against the government respondents, pointing out that the takees “want[ed] to be
really not made a lot worse off, at least not made a lot worse off
just so some other people [could] get a lot more money”;124 and
Justice Anthony Kennedy also showed an interest in this idea.125

120

Garnett, 105 Mich L Rev at 127–28 (cited in note 111).
Id at 132 (noting that the company chose to cover relocation costs out of a desire
for expediency, even though it did not believe that it was legally bound to do so).
122 Epstein, Takings at 115, 163–64 (cited in note 10).
123 See note 103 and accompanying text.
124 Kelo Transcript at *50 (cited in note 21).
125 See id at *22 (“Are there any writings or scholarship that indicates that when
you have property being taken from one private person ultimately to go to another private person, that what we ought to do is to adjust the measure of compensation, so that
the owner—the condemnee—can receive some sort of a premium for the development?”).
121
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Owners may feel the injustices of the fair market value standard
when their losses are other citizens’ gains.126
B.

Difficulties in Attaining Honest Subjective Valuations

While there are potential inefficiencies and injustices that
result from the payment of only the fair market value of taken
property, the main issue, as alluded to in several court decisions,
is that arriving at the subjective valuation is difficult. This is
because an owner has an incentive to lie when asked directly
about how much she values a particular piece of property, and
devising clever mechanisms to avoid this problem requires making unrealistic assumptions.
The problem of lying in this context is so intuitive that
scholars who discuss it rarely cite articles to support the
claim.127 Because an individual can always claim that her subjective value of a possession is arbitrarily high and can assert arbitrary preferences, she could employ a holdout strategy under the
guise of claiming a high subjective valuation.128
Economists have attempted to develop sophisticated mechanisms to incentivize individuals to reveal their subjective valuations, but the assumptions required for these mechanisms to
work are unrealistic. A creative method of incentivizing individuals to reveal their subjective valuations has been developed by
Professors Florenz Plassmann and T. Nicolaus Tideman, who
have argued that all homeowners would provide honest estimates of subjective valuations if governments tied property taxes to subjective valuations and if the probability of a loss from a
126 For example, the Director of the NAACP’s Washington Bureau, Hilary Shelton,
emphasized how “just compensation” was a “misnomer.” In his congressional testimony
about the Kelo decision, he argued that “[t]he fact that a particular property is identified
and designated for economic development [ ] certainly means that the market is currently undervaluing that property or that the property has some trapped value that the
market is not yet recognizing.” In addition, when he was asked whether “adequate compensation” would address some of the disparate impacts of eminent domain on poor
communities, he replied that “[i]t would begin the process.” The Kelo Decision: Investigating Takings of Homes and Other Private Property; Hearing before the Committee on
the Judiciary, United States Senate, 109th Cong, 1st Sess 12, 13, 19 (2005) (statement of
Hilary O. Shelton, Director, Washington Bureau, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Washington, DC).
127 See, for example, Miceli, The Economic Theory of Eminent Domain at 59 (cited in
note 14) (discussing the “obvious question of why landowners cannot simply be asked
how much they value the land and then be paid that amount in compensation,” and arguing that “[t]he problem with this approach, of course, is that landowners would have
an incentive to misrepresent their valuations”).
128 See id.
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taking were equal to the valuation tax rate.129 The problem with
this approach is that there is no reason to expect that the tax rate
will be equal to the probability of a taking,130 especially because
this probability is likely to vary across the different types of properties eligible for takings.131 While Plassmann and Tideman do
not provide estimates, the probability of a loss from a taking is
so low that it is considered to be “near zero”132 over the entire
time that an individual owns a property. By contrast, most
American individuals can expect to pay between 0.5 and 1 percent of their properties’ value as property taxes on an annual
basis alone.133 Thus, the percentage expected to be paid in property taxes over the time the property is owned is not also “near
zero,” and the assumptions required by Plassmann and Tideman
do not hold.
There also is a behavioral-economics critique of subjective
valuation in the context of eminent domain takings that provides reason to be cautious about subjective valuation, even if
homeowners were being honest in reporting it. To the extent
that the subjective value of a home includes not having to move,
people overestimate the harm they will feel from an injury.134
This is related to the behavioral-economics finding that individuals may not do a good job of valuating nonmarket goods. For
example, in the context of assessing the consequences of health
changes, individuals focus more on what it is like to become unhealthy rather than to be unhealthy, resulting in “errors when
estimating the sum that they feel will adequately compensate
them.”135 Another behavioral-economics concern with providing
129 Florenz Plassmann and T. Nicolaus Tideman, Accurate Valuation in the Absence
of Markets, 36 Pub Fin Rev 334, 345–46 (2008).
130 See Miceli, The Economic Theory of Eminent Domain at 65 (cited in note 14).
131 One potential source for such variation is the fact that residences of owners with
more political power are less likely to be subject to eminent domain. See note 113 and
accompanying text.
132 Thomas J. Miceli and Kathleen Segerson, Takings, in Boudewijn Bouckaert and
Gerrit De Geest, eds, 4 Encyclopedia of Law and Economics: The Economics of Public
and Tax Law 328, 334–35 (Edward Elgar 2000) (finding that “the probability of a physical taking is probably near zero for most landowners,” as “physical” contrasts with the
more probable but intangible taking by restrictions on use through zoning or environmental regulation).
133 Benjamin H. Harris and Brian David Moore, Residential Property Taxes in the
United States *2 (Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center, Nov 18, 2013), archived at
http://perma.cc/FZJ5-KTHH.
134 See John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco, and Jonathan S. Masur, Hedonic
Adaptation and the Settlement of Civil Lawsuits, 108 Colum L Rev 1516, 1534–35 (2008).
135 Id at 1535.
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compensation for an individual’s estimate of her own subjective
value is that the deviation between the fair market value and
the indemnity value may be a consequence of an endowment effect. An endowment effect occurs when someone perceives the
cost of losing a good she already owns (that is, the individual’s
“willingness to accept” for the good) to be larger than the benefits of gaining the same good assuming she did not own it (that
is, the individual’s “willingness to pay” for the good).136
Because of these two behavioral distortions, the proposal offered by Professors Jack Knetsch and Thomas Borcherding to
estimate subjective value based on owner characteristics is problematic. Knetsch and Borcherding propose making “a series of
apparently sincere bids” to determine owners’ reservation prices
for their properties.137 These reservation prices are then modeled
empirically to be a function of observable individual characteristics, and that function can be used to estimate subjective value
in future eminent domain cases given the owners’ characteristics.138 However, when cognitive biases cause harms to be overestimated, an allocatively efficient taking might not occur because
the owner’s estimated (expected) subjective valuation is higher
than the actual (expected) subjective value, the individual demands too much, and thus a higher-value taker does not engage
in eminent domain.
With the standard overestimation arising from a focus on
the change rather than on the final state, this bidding approach
will generate welfare losses, as this sort of overestimation involves estimating a value that the owner would later regret.139
The efficiency implications of endowment effects in the valuations generated by Knetsch and Borcherding’s proposal, however, are more complicated. One could argue that the presence of
an endowment effect does not create welfare problems, since allocative efficiency requires that goods be allocated to an individual whose willingness to accept exceeds all others’ willingness to

136 See Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein, and Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 Stan L Rev 1471, 1483–84 (1998).
137 Knetsch and Borcherding, 29 U Toronto L J at 247 (cited in note 49).
138 Id.
139 For example, this method would lead to estimates of the required just compensation that would be too high; properties that the individual (in retrospect) would wish had
been taken would, in fact, not be taken, as a result of the heightened compensation requirement and the owner’s biases in the negotiation process.
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pay, regardless of the existence of endowment effects.140 Thus, a
subjective valuation that includes an endowment effect is still
the correct standard for the amount that a taker’s value should
exceed. However, as Professor Russell Korobkin argues, this
standard is only sometimes appropriate. When the gap is caused
by resource constraints—which is to say, “differences in ability
to back up preferences with dollars that result from different
levels of wealth”—the estimate that includes the endowment effect (the higher willingness to accept) is proper for determining
whether the good has been allocated to the highest-value user.141
But when the endowment effect is due to wealth effects, it is not
obvious that this is correct;142 when the endowment effect is due
to “regret-avoidance behavior or the disutility caused by selling,”
the lower willingness-to-pay standard is the correct one for welfare analyses.143 Thus, the presence of endowment effects in
Knetsch and Borcherding’s estimates could generate efficiency
losses if certain potential sources of the endowment effect cause
the gap, as the endowment effect could prevent efficient eminent
domain takings from occurring due to regret avoidance or to the
disutility of selling.
In the academic context, Judge Posner has raised another
problem with subjective valuations for takings—one that, in
theory, would persist even if an accurate estimation of these
valuations were possible. Posner argues that taking subjective
value into account can incentivize overinvestment in property so
that the owner can make money due to the subjective valuation
exceeding the fair market value.144 Although he makes the comment in passing, Posner seems concerned that owners who foresee the possibility of a taking will purchase property that they
would not otherwise have purchased but for supra–fair market
value compensation to earn the premium between their subjective valuations and what they actually paid. However, it is not
clear that there is an inefficiency here: the individual purchases
140 For this argument, see Herbert Hovenkamp, Legal Policy and the Endowment
Effect, 20 J Legal Stud 225, 226–29 (1991).
141 Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, 97 Nw U L Rev
1227, 1249, 1257 (2003).
142 See id at 1248, 1257–59 (illustrating that all the other types of factors driving an
endowment effect that the author mentions are covered under the categories in which
willingness to accept or willingness to pay is clearly relevant).
143 Id at 1258.
144 Posner, Economic Analysis of Law at 64–65 (cited in note 104) (arguing that the
law’s attempt to address this concern by prohibiting compensation for property enhancements made after the announcement of government projects is insufficient).
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goods that she values at an amount that is higher than the purchase price. Thus, an inefficiency will occur only if an individual
is able to lie about her subjective valuation.
Perhaps Posner is concerned that strategic purchasing takes
resources away from goods that provide more utility but that are
less likely to be the target of eminent domain actions. However,
this will be a problem only if the probability of a taking is very
high, as the expected profits (the difference between the amount
paid and the subjective value, multiplied by the probability of
being subject to eminent domain) go down when eminent domain is unlikely. Therefore, as the probability of takings decreases, these expected profits decrease—perhaps failing to justify the transaction costs of purchasing—and the probability of
being stuck with a property that was not as good as the alternative rises. Thus, the low probability of the use of eminent domain discussed earlier145 makes the harms that Posner identifies
likely to be small. As a result, a well-being-analysis approach
that provides a good measure of subjective valuation need not
address this particular concern.146
C.

Well-Being Analysis as a Solution to the Problems Inherent
in Subjective Valuation

A well-being analysis attempts to trace an indifference curve
between different states of the world and income levels, allowing
us to infer what level of income would make an individual just as
well off as if an event did not occur.147 This is done by asking respondents “only simple questions rating their current level of
happiness,” which, as opposed to some of the questions outlined
in Part II.B, “do not require them to value nonmarket goods.”148
The individual reports of happiness levels are compared to the
different events that those individuals are experiencing and, ideally, the reports follow a set of individuals to control for individual “fixed effects” for happiness—that is, an individual’s average
measured happiness level.149 Given the potential for cognitive
145

See note 132 and accompanying text.
For further criticisms of the overinvestment concern, see Chang, Private Property
and Takings Compensation at 28–29 (cited in note 119) (pointing to risk aversion as one
reason that individuals may choose not to overinvest).
147 See Oswald and Powdthavee, 37 J Legal Stud at S220 (cited in note 27).
148 John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco, and Jonathan S. Masur, Happiness
and the Law 88 (Chicago 2015) (“[T]he techniques used by [well-being analysis] avoid a
number of [ ] methodological problems.”).
149 Formally, this is done using the following regression specification:
146
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biases, this approach is especially useful when there are no
“price tags attached” to the valuable item in question,150 as is the
case for the subjective valuation of a home.
The success of a well-being analysis in the context of establishing the subjective value of a property is a function of the data set available. The ideal data set would be a sample that involved individuals who were subject to eminent domain, were
forced to move, and were paid only the fair market value of their
properties; it would also include a control group that was not
subject to eminent domain. All individuals would be followed for
a few years after the act of eminent domain occurred, and they
would be asked questions about their levels of well-being.151 By
looking at the effects of being exogenously treated as the target
of eminent domain actions (that is, of being randomly chosen to
have their properties taken) on the happiness levels of the
takees, the well-being analysis would show exactly how much,
on average, individuals would need to be paid on top of the fair
market value to be left indifferent about having their property
taken and being forced to move. This value would include compensation for moving costs as well as the subjective-value premium of the homes. These costs can be encapsulated in how
much less happy individuals are if they move and are not compensated for that move plus their subjective-value premium,
compared to the control individuals who were not subject to eminent domain.
Even with less ideal data sets in which the individuals were
not subject to forced moves, the well-being effects of moving can
be estimated by looking at the effects on happiness of selling and
moving away from a property that one owned, controlling for the

,

,

,

,

,

.

In this equation, , captures whether a bad life event happened in period , is the individual’s characteristics,
is the level of income of individual , and
is a fixed effect
for individual . The sum of
is the calculated impact of the bad life event on
life-satisfaction measures ( , ). Thus, because translates between life-satisfaction levels and income, the damages amount would be
/ .
150 Oswald and Powdthavee, 37 J Legal Stud at S218 (cited in note 27). See also
generally John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco, and Jonathan S. Masur, Well-Being
Analysis vs. Cost-Benefit Analysis, 62 Duke L J 1603 (2013) (arguing for the validity of a
well-being-analysis approach as opposed to a cost-benefit approach in evaluating particular policies, and pointing to the virtue of a well-being-analysis approach in cases in
which opportunities to quantify revealed preferences are limited).
151 Note that there are many alternative measurements of well-being. For an overview of the most common alternatives, see Ed Diener, et al, Well-Being for Public Policy
11–19 (Oxford 2009).
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fact that the individual chose to move in the first place. This
Comment follows that approach in attempting to control for the
effects of the act of moving (from either owned or rented residences) on happiness, using the BHPS data. This approach is
necessary because the reasons the individual chose to move
could be related to happiness, and thus any estimation of the effect of giving up one’s home for only fair market value could be
skewed by the same happiness-influencing life events that provoked the decision to relocate in the first place. For example, one
could move because one receives a job that one likes better but
that does not pay more (an improvement in quality of life that
would be unobserved in the data), and thus the observed effect
on happiness of the move might be positive. However, the effect
of giving up one’s house for only its fair market value might still
be negative, even though the net effect of the move is positive.
Thus, simply looking at the effect on happiness of moving from a
house that one owns is likely to be biased.
This approach measures different effects than would be expected with a data set surveying takees (since moving is controlled for, the impact of moving on happiness is not estimated).
With a survey of takees, there is no need to control for the decision to move, because the decision was not chosen by the individuals and thus there is no reason to believe that this decision
is correlated with unobserved life events separate from moving
that affect happiness. Thus, the data from takees would encapsulate the cost of being subject to eminent domain and being
paid only fair market value compensation. However, because
with the BHPS data it is necessary to control for the choice to
move in order to attempt to estimate the effects of the different
motivations for moving, the effect on happiness of having to uproot is left out of the estimate. To improve the data, the estimate
could be supplemented with tax data on the costs of moving in
order to arrive at a similar estimate. These data are easily accessible, because individuals report their costs of moving to the
federal government in order to get tax deductions for those
moves.152 By incorporating the financial cost of moving based on
tax data, the well-being results from survey data involving individuals who were not the targets of eminent domain can still be
helpful in establishing what takees would need to be paid in order to be “made whole.”
152

See 26 USC § 217.
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Such an approach would address some of the problems discussed above in establishing subjective value. First, there would
be no incentive for individuals to lie. In the ideal study, an individual would already have been compensated for the taking of
her property, and thus she would have no reason to believe that
the answers she gave about her happiness levels would influence
her compensation. Moreover, results from a well-being analysis
would not be sensitive to the estimation problems mentioned
above.153 The fact that individuals adapt to new conditions better
than expected would be captured in the well-being levels that
are reported. Further, the owner would never have to estimate her
subjective valuation of her house (which prevents inflation due to
endowment effects caused by estimation distortions), but she would
still have to recognize any disutility of selling that is part of an endowment effect and that should be counted.154 Thus, such an approach is likely to provide a better estimate of subjective value
than the best honest guess an individual could provide ex ante.155
In addition, to the extent that one can reasonably expect
adaptation,156 a well-being analysis helps capture variation in
the way that individuals adapt.157 Well-being analysis provides
data about who is most likely to adapt to losing their homes under eminent domain. As a result, using the results of such an
analysis to determine compensation for eminent domain takings
can help make eminent domain more efficient in the KaldorHicks sense (that is, in a way that maximizes total welfare and
could leave all individuals as well or better off with adequate
lump-sum transfers).158 With a sufficiently large data set, this
analysis could provide support for laws like the Missouri law
mentioned above, in which the “heritage value” premium for
153

See Part II.B.
See notes 141–43 and accompanying text.
155 See Bronsteen, Buccafusco, and Masur, 62 Duke L J at 1620 (cited in note 150)
(discussing how quickly an individual’s happiness returns to pre-accident levels after
losing a limb, and suggesting that “[s]tudies of people who have lost limbs provide fairly
accurate information on the hedonic loss associated with losing an arm”).
156 This is not something that should be taken for granted, as well-being analyses
show that adaptability varies significantly across different types of events. See Diener, et
al, Well-Being for Public Policy at 106 (cited in note 151) (contrasting the adaptability to
marriage with the adaptability to widowhood).
157 See id (finding that in well-being analyses about adaptability to life events, “a
pattern that emerged in all the analyses [ ] conducted was that adaptation effects varied
considerably among the individuals that [were] examined”).
158 See Nicholas Kaldor, Welfare Propositions of Economics and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility, 49 Econ J 549, 550–52 (1939); J.R. Hicks, The Foundations of Welfare
Economics, 49 Econ J 696, 711–12 (1939).
154
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taking a property from someone who has lived there for an unusually long period makes the taking more expensive for the taker.159 A well-being-analysis approach would help establish
whether the wedge between the fair market value and the subjective value is larger for individuals who have stayed in their
homes for longer. If so, then this approach could establish a basis for more states to implement laws like Missouri’s or for
courts to apply a variable multiplier. Potential takers would
then internalize the losses that they imposed on individuals who
have stayed in their homes for a long time, and they would thus
accomplish the public goals in a cheaper way by seeking out individuals for whom moving is less costly.
A well-being-analysis approach responds to the pragmatic
compromise seen in the federal constitutional cases, because
well-being analyses can be highly reliable if done rigorously and
with large samples.160 There is likely to be some measurement error, but because this error is in the dependent variable, the effect
in the regression process is on the error terms rather than on the
regression coefficients themselves, and the ordinary least squares
(OLS) regression still works in large samples as long as that error
is not correlated with explanatory variables.161 The large sample
size can help compensate for any problems in reliability within
individual-level data providing measures of well-being.162
Although one’s initial reaction might be to suppose that emotions are not part of law, “nothing in conventional welfare economics implies that preferences in an emotion state should be
discounted.”163 Other critics, especially mainstream economists,
object to a well-being-analysis approach from a consistency
standpoint, worrying about the “interpersonal comparability of

159

See note 62 and accompanying text.
See Bronsteen, Buccafusco, and Masur, 62 Duke L J at 1624 (cited in note 150)
(“Meta-analyses of different well-being tools have found high levels of reliability for both
life satisfaction and experience sampling methods.”).
161 See Jeffrey M. Wooldridge, Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data 76–78 (MIT 2d ed 2010) (demonstrating that in the case of random measurement error
in the dependent variable, “the larger error variance violates none of the assumptions
needed for OLS estimation to have its desirable large-sample properties,” and stating
that when “the measurement error is uncorrelated with the explanatory variables, OLS
is perfectly appropriate”).
162 See Diener, et al, Well-Being for Public Policy at 69–70 (cited in note 151) (discussing how “large sample sizes compensate for low reliability” in large-scale surveys).
163 Eric A. Posner, Law and the Emotions *28 (John M. Olin Law & Economics
Working Paper Series), archived at http://perma.cc/27UF-CZB9.
160
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well-being.”164 But a well-being-analysis approach fits in well with
accepted assumptions of psychology, sociology, and health economics.165 Even the well-respected traditional neoclassical economist Professor Gary Becker admitted the relevance of well-being
analyses to economic questions.166 Moreover, emotional effects
play an important role in intentional tort law, as damages are allowed for the intentional infliction of emotional distress;167 thus,
eminent domain’s similarity to an intentional tort as a deliberate
action makes particularly relevant the emotional component of
the subjective value that a well-being analysis may capture.
Some scholars might argue that a well-being analysis, as estimated by looking at movers’ subjective valuations, does not go
far enough. Fennell has argued that subjective value is just one
part of the undercompensation that occurs in the context of eminent domain:
The uncompensated increment is made up of three distinct
components: (1) the increment by which the property owner’s subjective value exceeds fair market value; (2) the
chance of reaping a surplus from trade (that is, of obtaining
an amount larger than one’s own true subjective valuation);
and (3) the autonomy of choosing for oneself when to sell.168
A well-being analysis of movers would capture only the first
of these components, and a well-being analysis of individuals
who were actually displaced by eminent domain projects would
capture only the happiness costs of losing the first and the last
components. However, it is not clear that the second component
fits in with the make-whole standard that the Court requires:169
in breaking a contract, there is no obligation to share some of

164 Bernard M.S. van Praag and Barbara E. Baarsma, Using Happiness Surveys to
Value Intangibles: The Case of Airport Noise, 115 Econ J 224, 236 (2005).
165 See id.
166 Luis Rayo and Gary S. Becker, Evolutionary Efficiency and Happiness, 115 J Polit
Econ 302, 327–28 (2007) (modeling “happiness as a biological measurement instrument
that guides the agent’s decisions,” and concluding that “when viewed from an economic
perspective, happiness appears to have multiple signs of statistical inference”).
167 See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 (1965).
168 Fennell, 2004 Mich St L Rev at 958–59 (cited in note 38) (citations omitted). See
also Wyman, 41 UC Davis L Rev at 260 (cited in note 23) (discussing how eminent domain deprives takees of opportunities to bargain for shares of surplus from economicdevelopment projects).
169 See Part I.A.
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the surplus once the breached-against party is made just as well
off as if the breach did not occur.170
While some will argue that a well-being-analysis approach
applied to eminent domain takings does not go far enough, it at
least provides a rigorous way to estimate the subjective-value
premium that can exist for many reasons. In doing so, it workably
achieves an estimate that other methods have failed to reliably
yield. It makes progress on preventing some of the inefficiencies
associated with undercompensation, and it addresses concerns
about the justice of the fair market value compromise. The next
Part provides an example of what this helpful analysis might
look like in practice.
III. AN ESTIMATE OF THE WELL-BEING-ANALYSIS MULTIPLIER
FOR JUST COMPENSATION
This Part provides an example of how a well-being analysis—
based on a longitudinal study following residents of Great
Britain—can establish a basis for providing supra–fair market
value compensation in eminent domain cases. Using a wellbeing-analysis approach, this Part shows that moving from a
home that one owned in the previous three years correlates with
a statistically significant decline in well-being. The data also
show that this negative effect is higher for groups of individuals
whom one would expect to have higher subjective property valuations. Part III.A summarizes the data and explains why they
are well-suited for a well-being analysis, and Part III.B describes the methodology and the assumptions behind such an
analysis in this context. The estimated negative cost of giving up
a property that one owns for only the fair market value is discussed in Part III.C, and the implications of such a significant
estimate are discussed in Part III.D.
A.

Summary of the Data

The ideal data for a thorough well-being analysis are survey
data that include measures of overall well-being and that follow
170 See Posner, Economic Analysis of Law at 131 (cited in note 104), citing Oliver
Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv L Rev 457, 462 (1897) (“[I]t is not the policy of the law to compel adherence to contracts but only to require each party to choose
between performing in accordance with the contract and compensating the other party
for any injury resulting from a failure to perform.”). See also Holmes, 10 Harv L Rev at
462 (cited in note 170) (“The duty to keep a contract at common law means a prediction
that you must pay damages if you do not keep it—and nothing else.”).
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a group of individuals for multiple time periods; the BHPS data
set that this Part uses is one of the best examples of such a data
set.171 Paid for by the British government, this survey has been
conducted annually since 1991 with substantial efforts made to
follow up with previous respondents.172 Respondents are interviewed in successive waves: when an entire household moves,
the household members are followed to their new residence;
when an individual moves from the original household, the adult
members of her new household are also interviewed. The BHPS
data set provides a “nationally representative sample of households,”173 and it surveys over forty thousand individuals above
the age of fifteen.174 Because the individuals who are compensated in eminent domain cases are owners,175 the sample used in
this Comment is restricted to individuals who are currently
listed as primary homeowners or primary renters, as the household survey identifies up to two individuals in each category.176
The subset of individuals interviewed in the BHPS data set were
interviewed later with similar questions in the Understanding
Society data set177 in waves B through E, and these four waves
are also included in the regression analyses.
171 The attractiveness of this data set for well-being analyses is reflected in the variety
of articles using it to value factors that are not subject to market pricing. See, for example,
Oswald and Powdthavee, 37 J Legal Stud at S220 (cited in note 27) (using the BHPS data
set for “regression equations in which a measure of happiness is the dependent variable” to
“sketch an alternative . . . in the setting of emotional damages”); R. Layard, S. Nickell, and
G. Mayraz, The Marginal Utility of Income, 92 J Pub Econ 1846, 1847, 1856 (2008) (using a “measurement of experienced happiness in six major surveys,” including the BHPS,
to estimate “the elasticity [ ] of the marginal utility of income with respect to the level of
income”).
172 British Household Panel Survey, Waves 1-18, 1991-2009: Secure Access, National
Grid Reference (Easting, Northing, OSGRDIND) (UK Data Service, Jan 16, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/9RHK-9ZZ2.
173 Oswald and Powdthavee, 37 J Legal Stud at S224 (cited in note 27).
174 This number is calculated by counting unique identifiers in the pid variable that
occur in any wave. The subset that occurs in multiple waves and provides complete survey responses is much smaller, as is reflected in the number of observations in Table 3.
See British Household Panel Survey: Waves 1-18, 1991-2009 (UK Data Service, 2010)
(“BHPS Data”), online at http://discover.ukdataservice.ac.uk/catalogue/?sn=5151 (visited
Apr 5, 2016) (Perma archive unavailable).
175 See Kelo, 545 US at 496.
176 For example, consider the variables AHSOWR1 and ARENTP1. See BHPS Documentation and Questionnaires (University of Essex Institute for Social and Economic
Research), archived at http://perma.cc/2MPQ-VYD7.
177 Individuals in the BHPS data set can be linked to those in the Understanding
Society data using the variable pidp, which has the corresponding identification in the
BHPS data set for all individuals who were surveyed in both. See Understanding Society:
Waves 1-5, 2009-2014 (UK Data Service, Nov 19, 2015) (“Understanding Society Data”),
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This data set is useful for this Comment because survey respondents were asked about their life-satisfaction178 levels in the
majority of the waves. In addition to these indicators of happiness levels, the data include information about whether the individual moved from a home that someone in the household
owned (each year, this describes around 5 percent of the sample),
the distance that the individual moved, and the individual’s preferences with respect to moving in the previous years. The data set
also allows for nearly all the controls used by Professors Oswald
and Powdthavee in their aforementioned works;179 Oswald and
Powdthavee have pioneered the use of this data set for legal
valuation issues by estimating the effects of a death in the family or of a disability on happiness for the calculation of damages.180 In addition, the data set has information about whether
the individual wished to stay in a particular location, her reasons for moving, and her tenure at the home she owned. The last
variable in particular allows a well-being analysis to determine
whether the costs of giving up one’s home increase the longer
one has been there.
While this study is helpful for deriving a lower bound for the
cost of displacement from an owned property on life-satisfaction
measures (that is, the actual value is likely higher), it is not the
ideal data set for a well-being-analysis estimate of subjective
valuation. One problem with the data is that they mostly involve
people who made the choice to move rather than people who
were forced by the government to sell their properties.181 This is
because people who move typically choose to move, and thus
there may be a selection effect due to these individuals’ relatively lower costs of moving (that is, the individuals who move have,
on average, lower costs and lower subjective valuations than
online at http://discover.ukdataservice.ac.uk/catalogue/?sn=6614 (visited Apr 9, 2016)
(Perma archive unavailable).
178 In the data, this variable is wLFSATO, where w denotes the wave letter, which
is the round of surveying and represents a year range during which individuals were
surveyed. This variable is available for all survey years since 1997, except for 2002. The
surveyor asks the respondent to reply, on a scale of 1–7, to the question: “Using the same
scale how dissatisfied or satisfied are you with your life overall?” Living in Britain Wave 6 Coversheet *7 (UK Data Service) (“Wave 6 Questionnaire”), archived at
http://perma.cc/M4YB-MH6K ) (emphasis omitted).
179 See notes 76–81 and accompanying text.
180 See Part I.C.
181 While it is possible that some of the individuals in the data set moved due to eminent domain actions on the part of the British government, there is no way to identify
such individuals given the questions that were asked.
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those who stay).182 However, this implies that the result is a lower bound on the hedonic cost of moving, since one would expect
an individual targeted by a taking to have a higher cost of moving or a higher subjective value than a seller, due to the selection effects of choosing to sell and what this choice signals about
the extent to which an owner is sentimental about her residence.
Another difficulty in using this data set is that it generates
an estimate for the costs of moving on the well-being of British
residents rather than of American residents. Thus, this data set
is helpful only if it is reasonable to expect that the effects on
happiness of being paid only fair market value are similar in
both countries. The first question that this raises is whether one
would expect estimates across countries based on happiness regressions to be similar in general. Professors John Bronsteen,
Christopher Buccafusco, and Jonathan Masur acknowledge the
difficulties of using well-being survey results from other countries, but they believe the data are still comparable enough to be
relevant.183 For example, studies have shown that, across countries, the effect of income on happiness is consistent,184 which
implies some similarities in the sources of happiness across countries and counsels in favor of accepting the conversion between
happiness and dollars that the well-being analysis does based on
British data, and in favor of applying it in the American context.
Moreover, an article that focused on reported levels of happiness
in Great Britain and the United States found that “data from

182 See Fennell, 113 Colum L Rev Sidebar at 112 (cited in note 95) (“[D]ramatic
downward shifts [in subjective valuation] may occur due to changes in employment,
household configuration, health, and other factors. People who have experienced these
downward shifts are likely to be overrepresented among sellers, along with those who
never formed strong attachments to the home in the first place.”) (citation omitted).
183 Bronsteen, Buccafusco, and Masur, 62 Duke L J at 1626 n 110 (cited in note 150)
(arguing that “[e]mpirical studies have found [ ] that similarly situated individuals in
different countries have similar levels of life satisfaction . . . [which] suggests that subjective well-being measures may even be comparable across countries”).
184 See Betsey Stevenson and Justin Wolfers, Economic Growth and Subjective WellBeing: Reassessing the Easterlin Paradox *9 (NBER Working Paper Series, Aug 2008),
archived at http://perma.cc/R9GA-SQPQ (arguing that Gallup World Poll data “yield a
particularly close relationship between subjective well-being and the log of GDP per capita,” as “the correlation exceeds 0.8” for the 131 countries with “usable” GDP estimates);
Diener, et al, Well-Being for Public Policy at 198 (cited in note 151) (“The high degree of
cross-country correlation between average incomes and life satisfaction has convinced
some previous skeptics to take life satisfaction data more seriously as genuine measures
of well-being.”).
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Great Britain give noticeably similar results” to what was found
in the American context.185
The second question is whether it is reasonable to expect
British and American citizens to have similar attitudes about
property that would affect their subjective valuations. It is
worth noting that the United Kingdom and the United States
received nearly identical scores in a Property Rights Index constructed by the Property Rights Alliance,186 and the similar respect for property provides some evidence for a similar attachment. Although scholars have not yet produced studies that show
that British and American residents value homeownership identically, the homeownership rates across the countries are remarkably similar.187 Finally, one weak indicator that Americans
may value homeownership more than the British and thus have
a higher subjective valuation than the British is the fact that
the percentage of British renters who wish to own is lower than
the percentage of American renters who wish to own.188 Renters
often eventually do become homeowners; given that the two
countries have similar rates of homeownership—and assuming
that this attitude was held by renters in the past—this provides
some evidence that the British may attach less value to their
homes. As such, the estimate would be similar or might be a
lower bound.

185 David G. Blanchflower and Andrew J. Oswald, Well-Being over Time in Britain
and the USA, 88 J Pub Econ 1359, 1367 (2004).
186 The International Property Rights Index 2014 (Property Rights Alliance, 2014),
archived at http://perma.cc/C56V-KPW7 (assigning the United Kingdom a score of 7.8
and the United States a score of 7.7). Because no other country had the exact same score
as the United States, this means that no country was closer to the United States than
the United Kingdom was in terms of the protection of property rights.
187 See Drew DeSilver, Around the World, Governments Promote Home Ownership
(Pew Research Center, Aug 6, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/2TKK-ZD8C (showing
that in 2011, 65.0 percent and 67.9 percent of US and UK adults, respectively, were
homeowners); Dan Andrews and Aida Caldera Sánchez, The Evolution of Homeownership Rates in Selected OECD Countries: Demographic and Public Policy Influences, 2011
OECD J: Econ Stud 207, 212 (showing that in the 1990s, 66.2 percent and 67.5 percent of
US and UK adults, respectively, were homeowners, and that in 2004, 68.69 percent and
70.70 percent of US and UK adults, respectively, were homeowners).
188 While results from the British Social Attitudes Survey show that 45 to 46 percent of renters would rather own, 84 percent of Americans intend to buy. Compare Alison
Wallace, Public Attitudes to Housing *9 (University of York, Sept 2010), archived at
http://perma.cc/38DV-9M2C, with Study Finds 84 Percent of Renters Intend on Buying a
Home (National Mortgage Professional Magazine, May 21, 2012), archived at
http://perma.cc/38WR-PHMS.
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Methodology

This Section describes the estimation strategy. Part III.B.1
presents a more formal regression model and explains how it relates to the individual choices present in the data set. Part
III.B.2 describes how the estimation works and its relation to
previous well-being analyses, clarifying why the assumptions in
the formal model are important.
1. The formal model.
The happiness regression analysis assumes that an individual has a separable utility function (that is, each aspect of an
individual’s life influences her utility independently from other
aspects, and the effect of each aspect can be isolated). The utility
that the individual maximizes is a function of several factors, including work-related income, other income, and behaviors such
as the choice to sell one’s home at fair market value.
Formally, the individual faces the following maximization
problem, in which she maximizes utility by choosing certain actions ( ) and by choosing whether to move from her home:
,

∗

,

where
is the individual’s income level, is the individual’s
nonlabor income, is a general vector of actions that the individual can choose (such as consumption decisions),
is the
cost of moving, and
is the utility cost of giving up an owned
home net of the payments that one receives when selling it. This
cost is experienced only by individuals who move from homes
they own, since
is equal to 1 if an individual moves from
a home that she owns. Moreover, the model assumes that
,
which represents the benefits of moving given the reasons that
were specified, is independent of whether one owns. That is,
these benefits are constant across owners and renters; so, for
example, if a person moves because of a better job opportunity,
her utility level will be the same regardless of whether she owns
or rents.189 Note that each individual made the choice of whether
to own a home in the previous period. This means the choice to
189 This is a strong assumption, but one reason to make it is that the movers in the
regression sample are restricted to include only moving individuals who expected to stay
in their homes. Thus, the decision to own or rent was not conditioned on expectations
that the utility from moving would be high enough to choose to move.
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own the home from which one is considering moving is not part of
the individual’s current-period utility-maximization problem.190
If an individual chooses to move, the increase in utility due
to moving minus the utility cost of selling one’s home and being
paid only fair market value is greater than the value of staying.
That is,
,

.

,

∗

In other words, if the data show individuals moving, this is because the utility associated with moving—which includes the
cost of giving up one’s home and receiving only fair market value
in return—exceeds the utility of staying.
The parameter to be estimated (as described below) is the
sum of money, , such that the moving individual is compensated for having to give up the home she owned while being paid
only the fair market value. That is, is the value that makes the
following equation hold:
,

∗

.

,

This equation simplifies to:
,

∗

,

.

This estimated value can then be interpreted as the makewhole amount: the amount that leaves an individual indifferent
between (1) moving from a home that she owned and being paid
only fair market value, and (2) moving but not having to bear
the subjective-valuation wedge.191 That is, it is the amount necessary to compensate the owner for any additional loss of goodwill in the neighborhood and memories associated with her residence compared to the average renter, and for all the
idiosyncratic investments she made in the property that were
not fully reflected in its fair market value.192 This is equivalent to
trying to find the amount of money that would make the utility
levels of the individuals who sold their homes equal to the utility

190 A more complicated model would reflect the fact that if one chooses to move, one
has to make a decision as to whether to own or rent the new residence—but for simplicity, this model assumes that the choice is the same for owners and renters. Later regressions do not make this assumption, as they control for current-period ownership status.
191 For a similar setup but with the death of a loved one represented by , see Oswald
and Powdthavee, 37 J Legal Stud at S222–23 (cited in note 27).
192 See Part II.A.1.
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levels of those who moved but did not have to sell a home to do so
(that is, who rented rather than owned).
To estimate , the empirical strategy follows the methodology
used by Oswald and Powdthavee in their works using happiness
regressions to estimate compensation. In their articles, the regressions “trace out a form of indifference curve between income and
any kind of life event.”193 This curve is then used to establish the
amount that an individual would need to be paid to be just as well
off in a state in which she was paid that amount and the event
happened, as compared to the counterfactual state in which the
event did not happen at all. Oswald and Powdthavee do this using
the BHPS data set to estimate the cost of the death of a loved
one194 and to estimate the cost of an event causing disability.195
Specifically, Table 3 in this Comment reflects an adjusted regression specification similar to that of Oswald and Powdthavee,196
in which
,

,

,
,
,

,
,

,

,

,

,

,

,

.

,

,

In this specification,
, is the life-satisfaction value reported by individual at time period ;
is the individual’s average level of happiness in the data;
takes a
, ,
,
value of 1 if the individual moved in period and owned the residence prior to that move;
takes a value of 1 if the in,
dividual moved in period , regardless of whether she owned the
residence she moved from; , is a vector of individual-level controls, including personal and household characteristics that
could affect life satisfaction and that might be correlated with
the variable of interest (most notably, income); and , is the error term in the regression.197 The coefficients of special interest

193

Oswald and Powdthavee, 37 J Legal Stud at S220 (cited in note 27).
Id at S217.
195 See generally Oswald and Powdthavee, 92 J Pub Econ 1061 (cited in note 77).
Although a similar equation is not provided in the article on bereavement, Tables 3 and
4 in that article reflect a similar regression specification. Oswald and Powdthavee, 37 J
Legal Stud at S234–37 (cited in note 27).
196 Oswald and Powdthavee, 92 J Pub Econ at 1067 (cited in note 77).
197 Id at 1067–69. Specifically, this vector includes sex; age; age squared divided by
100; log of real household income per capita; and dummy variables for relationship status, employment status, student status, education level and achievement, homeownership status, number of children, and household size.
194
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here are , , and , which capture the effect on an individual’s happiness of moving from a home she owns in the first year,
second year, and third year after the move, respectively, controlling for the general effects of moving on happiness in those
years. Thus, the coefficients , , and
are the cost in terms
of life satisfaction of giving up a home one owned and of being
paid only its fair market value. As in Oswald and Powdthavee’s
calculation of compensation for the death of a family member,
these coefficients of special interest can be used to estimate by
using the coefficient on income to convert the effect of moving on
happiness into monetary terms.198
2. Discussion of the assumptions behind the model and
their validity.
Oswald and Powdthavee lay out the following identification
assumptions (that is, the assumptions about the data that must
hold for the inferences to be valid) that are necessary for such an
approach in order to estimate . In this Comment, is the makewhole amount that leaves the individual indifferent between
(1) moving from a home that she owned and being paid only fair
market value, and (2) moving but without bearing the subjectivevaluation wedge. But in Oswald and Powdthavee’s articles, is
the compensation amount that leaves the individual indifferent
between a death in the family with compensation and the family
member living without the compensation (and similarly indifferent in the context of losing a limb) in terms of happiness levels.199 The assumptions are:
1. Individuals in a sample must be followed over a reasonably long period, so that information on them is
available before and after [the event.]
2. The bad life event must be exogenous.
3. There needs to be a control group of individuals unaffected by the event.
4. The sample should be reasonably representative of
the adult population.
198 See Oswald and Powdthavee, 37 J Legal Stud at S231 (cited in note 27) (using
the “coefficient on real household income” to “work out how much income would be required to offset the distress from an event such as bereavement”).
199 Id at S223; Oswald and Powdthavee, 92 J Pub Econ at 1062 (cited in note 77)
(using the name ∗ rather than to denote the same parameter of interest).
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5. A set of control variables, including income, should be
available in the data set, so that confounding influences can be differenced out.200
The methodology and the data set used in this Comment
meet most of these criteria. The sample is over an eighteen-year
period, which is a greater time period than those used by most of
the articles in this literature. Similarly, the sample includes a
control group of individuals who did not move. As mentioned
above, the creators of the data set took steps to ensure that it
was representative of the adult British population,201 and the
vast number of questions asked—including a 259-page questionnaire in one wave202—allows for the construction of a set of
reasonable control variables.
The more tenuous part of the approach has to do with the
inapplicability of the second identification assumption regarding
exogeneity in a well-being analysis of moving: because the individual makes a choice to move away from a home that she owns,
the move from an owned home is not exogenous. That is, when
the sample of movers is not restricted to individuals who have
been subject to eminent domain, one can reasonably expect
those who move to be responding to life events—such as becoming dissatisfied with their communities—that are generally unobserved and that are highly correlated with happiness. This
creates an endogeneity problem. That is, the choice to move is
related to unobserved events or conditions that are highly related to happiness levels, and thus the econometrician cannot disentangle the effects on happiness due to moving from the effects
on happiness due to those events that she does not observe. For
this reason, a well-being analysis would ideally be performed using a data set that involved individuals who were subject to eminent domain. In such a data set, the fact that individuals were
forced to move would mean that unobservable events motivating
individuals to move would no longer be a problem.203
200

Oswald and Powdthavee, 37 J Legal Stud at S223 (cited in note 27).
See id at S224.
202 See Wave 6 Questionnaire (cited in note 178) (presenting one of the shorter
questionnaires).
203 That is, although the population subject to eminent domain may be different
from the population that is not (as discussed above, potentially due to race), by controlling for individual characteristics, the analysis would be consistent with Oswald and
Powdthavee’s approach. It could also isolate the effects of experiencing eminent domain,
because going through eminent domain (and receiving fair market value compensation)
is itself more like a death in the family or a lost limb in that it is not chosen in response
201
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While the event of moving from an owned home is not exogenous in the BHPS data set, the above regression specification
aims to control for any influences on happiness that are correlated with the decision to move from an owned home. The goal of
doing this is to identify the particular effect of the process of receiving fair market value for one’s home when selling it. First,
the regressions include controls for the different life events that
can motivate a move by making use of the reasons provided for
the move. By including these in the regressions, the relationship
between those events and happiness is estimated and controlled
for. Moreover, to the extent that a move is an action taken to
improve one’s happiness level (recall that an individual moves
only because she expects to be happier moving rather than staying), the regression equations also control for this general effect
of moving. Finally, the regressions include a control for whether
the individual upgraded to another owned home that was worth
more in value, as this is another potential source of happiness.
After these sources of variation in happiness are controlled for,
what remains is the effect of being paid the fair market value for
one’s home. Thus, even though this event is not exogenous, its
effect can be estimated. Moreover, the timing supports an inference of causation, as the decision to move was made prior to the
observed level of happiness.204
The individuals who move but do not give up owned homes
help to separately identify the effects of ownership because of
the relationship between the move itself and the underlying rationale for the move on happiness levels. As long as the events
underlying the rationales for moving are related to happiness in
the same way for renting movers as they are for owning movers,
the residual effect of giving up one’s home for fair market value
can be estimated.
For the identification strategy to work, it must be the case
that there is a decent number of renters moving for the same
reasons that owners move, such that the effect of that rationale
on happiness can be separately estimated. As Table 1 shows,
owners who move typically have reasons for moving that are
to factors that the econometrician cannot observe, but instead it simply (and unfortunately) happens to the individuals.
204 Of course, the move could be in response to a particular trend in the individual’s
happiness level, and thus the change in happiness could precede the move. For example,
a relationship with a family member could have disintegrated, and the move was away
from a family member. This would have affected the individual’s happiness level before
and after the move. Controlling for the reasons helps to address this.
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similar to those of renters who move, and thus identification will
not be a problem.
TABLE 1. REPORTED REASONS FOR MOVING AMONG MOVERS IN
THE REGRESSION SAMPLE
Reason

Moving Renters

Moving Owners

Move In with Partner

43

66

Split from Partner

44

159

Move In with Family

8

9

Move from Family

3

4

Move In with Friend

4

0

Closer to Family or Friend

41

60

Move to College

20

7

Left College

8

0

Job Reason, Self

76

108

Job Reason, Other

10

36

Retirement

2

7

Evicted or Repossessed

96

27

Larger Accommodation

72

213

Smaller Accommodation

62

111

Own Accommodation

11

14

Buy Accommodation

56

11

Health Reasons

35

28

No Stairs

25

24

Another Type

5

3

Other Accommodation Aspects

17

37

Disliked Previous Accommodation

6

1

Better Accommodation

35

23

Privacy

3

4

Wants Change

12

13

Disliked Isolation

3

19

Move to Rural Environment

3

10

Move from Rural Environment

0

0

Traffic

1

1

Area Unsafe

10

3

Noise

6

10
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Area Unfriendly

20

8

To a Specific Place

8

15

Disliked Area

18

32

Other

77

176

Source: BHPS Data (cited in note 174); Understanding Society Data (cited in note 177).

Not only are there owners and renters in each category, but the
numbers are quite similar across the broader categories. While
there are fewer owners who move due to eviction or foreclosure,
there are no categories in which there are many owners who
move but too few renters to be able to estimate the effects.
Finally, all movers (both renters and owners) who intended
to move are dropped from the data set. That is, the indicator for
whether someone moved from a certain place is 1 only if she indicated that she wished to stay in the previous residence in the
period before moving. This is important because it helps support
the assumption that the benefit of moving for a given specified
reason is constant whether or not the individual owned the
home. If the reason for a move was expected, the value of that
reason might be reflected in the housing-tenure choice (renters
might, on average, expect more of a reason to move). This restriction also has the benefit of making the moving population
here more like takees, since takees also indicate a desire not to
move or sell. After limiting the moving population to individuals
who are designated as “primary renters” or “primary owners,”
there are still 841 renting movers and 1306 owning movers. Table
2 shows the distribution of these movers over the years in terms
of the first year in which the effects of the moves are observed.
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TABLE 2. DISTRIBUTION OF MOVERS IN THE REGRESSION SAMPLE
Year after Move

Total
Observations

Renters Who
Moved

Owners Who
Moved

1997

6,603

47

44

1998

6,622

44

65

1999

7,962

44

74

2000

7,641

51

77

2001

11,106

82

105

2003

11,825

66

112

2004

11,497

73

136

2005

10,992

59

123

2006

11,013

62

80

2007

10,916

64

124

2008

10,668

56

118

2009

10,190

62

70

2010

6,562

48

77

2011

6,245

31

34

2012

5,770

20

35

2013

5,573

32

32

Source: BHPS Data (cited in note 174); Understanding Society Data (cited in note 177).

Note that there are no observations for the year 2002, as the
life-satisfaction question was not asked during that wave of the
survey.205
C.

Results

After controlling for the effect of moving, the regression results demonstrate a clear negative effect from moving from a
home that one owns. The coefficients imply a multiplier that is
about 22 percent for compensation that does not include moving
expenses. Table 3 presents the results when the dependent variable is the life-satisfaction variable.

205 BHPS Documentation - Subject Category Index (University of Essex Institute for
Social and Economic Research), archived at http://perma.cc/3HUY-6VDD (showing that
the variable wLFSATO, which is “Satisfaction with: life overall,” is not available in wave
K of the survey).
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TABLE 3. IMPACT OF MOVING ON LIFE-SATISFACTION VALUES
Variables
Moved Two Years Ago
Moved One Year Ago
Moved in Previous Year
Owned and Moved Two
Years Ago
Owned and Moved One
Year Ago
Owned and Moved in
Previous Year
Household Income
Household Size
Homeowner
Primary Owner
Primary Renter

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

0.0419
(0.0545)
0.176***
(0.0562)
0.253***
(0.0584)
0.0634
(0.0642)
-0.0206
(0.0635)
-0.136**
(0.0661)
2.02e-06***
(1.46e-07)
-0.0229***
(0.00428)
0.177***
(0.0206)
-0.0536***
(0.0134)
-0.124***
(0.0219)

-0.0269
(0.0450)
0.00268
(0.0473)
0.0795*
(0.0483)
0.0117
(0.0538)
0.00847
(0.0543)
-0.0958*
(0.0550)
2.43e-07
(1.69e-07)
-0.0283***
(0.00616)
-0.0602*
(0.0320)
-0.0249
(0.0178)
-0.0916***
(0.0279)

0.0203
(0.0580)
0.175**
(0.0589)
0.198***
(0.0626)
0.104
(0.679)
-0.0245
(0.0667)
-0.0848
(0.0705)
2.90e-06***
(2.16e-07)
-0.0339***
(0.00486)
0.166***
(0.0219)
-0.0681***
(0.0142)
-0.134***
(0.0234)

0.0170**
(0.00727)
-0.0356***
(0.00158)
-0.360***
(0.0114)
-0.0349***
(0.00753)
0.536**
(0.255)
0.127***
(0.0164)
-0.0130**
(0.00553)
5.837***
(0.0528)

0.657
(0.458)
0.0142***
(0.00379)
-0.121***
(0.0125)
0.0573
(0.0534)
0.800**
(0.378)
0.0972***
(0.0177)
0.00337
(0.00712)
3.770***
(0.724)

-0.0267
(0.0450)
0.00289
(0.0473)
0.0797*
(0.0483)
-0.165
(0.254)
-0.168
(0.254)
-0.0996*
(0.0563)
2.43e-07
(1.69e-07)
-0.0283***
(0.00616)
-0.0604*
(0.0320)
-0.0248
(0.0178)
-0.0916***
(0.0279)
0.176
(0.248)
0.00417
(0.0508)
0.657
(0.458)
0.0142***
(0.00379)
-0.121***
(0.0125)
0.0573
(0.0535)
0.800**
(0.378)
0.0971***
(0.0177)
0.00336
(0.00712)
3.770***
(0.724)

131,821
0.060

131,821
0.013

131,821
0.013

107,682
0.065

Longtime Homeowner
House Value
Sex
Age
Unemployed
University Graduate
Current Student
Retired
Number of Children
Constant
Observations
R-Squared

0.0251***
(0.00769)
-0.0306***
(0.00165)
-0.354***
(0.0123)
-0.0832***
(0.00810)
0.376
(0.259)
-0.156***
(0.0179)
-0.0119*
(0.00608)
5.575***
(0.0547)
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NO
YES
YES
YES

YES
YES
YES
YES

YES
YES
YES
YES

NO
YES
YES
YES

NO

NO

NO

YES

21,078

21,078

Note: Robust standard errors are indicated in parentheses.
*** = p < 0.01, ** = p < 0.05, * = p < 0.1

Model 1 is a simple regression that leaves out individual
fixed effects—that is, the individual’s identity is not used in the
regression. Although the individual’s survey responses from
previous years were used to determine whether she moved and
for what reasons, the regression treats the happiness results
from an individual in one year and the next as if they were from
separate people. Models 2 and 3 both include fixed effects—that
is, the information on an individual’s happiness levels in previous and later years is used in the regressions. Model 3 is different from Model 2 in that the former includes indicators for
whether the individual moved from a house she had lived in for
a long time (more than fifteen years), and it also tests for the effect of controlling for moves from especially expensive homes.
One important caveat about the Long Housing Tenure variable
is that it includes only a subset of moves from houses in which
there was a long housing tenure, as the date at which ownership
was initiated was often not available in the data set.206 As such,
the dummy variable for this variable is 1 when it is known that
the owner lived there for more than fifteen years; when the
dummy variable is 0, however, it is also possible that the owner
lived there for more than fifteen years, and there may simply be
insufficient data to determine the length of the tenure. Model 4
instruments for household income using income from the past
period and whether the interviewer was able to verify the survey
respondent’s claimed income using a pay slip; income may be
endogenous to life satisfaction because, for example, someone
may be more able to make money when her psychological wellbeing is greater.207
206 See notes 174, 177 (presenting data that omit relevant information about the
date of initial ownership).
207 For an example of this step being taken in a similar context, see Oswald and
Powdthavee, 37 J Legal Stud at S231, S238 (cited in note 27) (proposing “income measured at t − 1” and “whether or not the interviewer sees the paycheck,” among other potential instruments).
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A fixed-effects model is the equivalent of including a dummy
variable for each individual person—that is, the regression estimates an average level of happiness for each person in the data
set.208 This helps to make the coefficients in front of the changing
regressor variables more precise to the extent that one would expect those regressor variables to interact with unobserved individual characteristics that do not change over time (as one might
expect when the outcome variable is happiness).209 For this reason, the estimates in Models 2 and 3 are better than those in
Model 1, as they make better use of the information in the data set.
For Models 2 and 3, the coefficients on the control variables
are generally in the proper direction that the theory would predict
in cases in which they are significant. For example, unemployment
is negatively correlated with higher individual happiness levels,
and when income is significant, it is positively correlated with lifesatisfaction levels. After controlling for the general effect of moving, these results imply that moving from a home that one owns
has a negative impact on happiness in the year after the move.
While the Long Housing Tenure variable that was included
in Model 3 is not statistically significant, this is perhaps due to
too few instances of long housing tenure (as discussed above) or
simply to a small sample, as homeownership has become more
popular in recent years in Britain210 and, thus, people are less
likely to move from homes that they have been in for a while.211
Similarly, the Top Quintile Home Value variable captures
whether the value of the home is in the top 20 percent of moving
individuals who wanted to stay in their homes. These variables
were included to check whether some owners are more hurt by
being paid only fair market compensation and to make sure that
the coefficients on the variables of interest are not being driven
by outliers. Neither of these points in the direction that one
would expect, but that may be because the assumptions about
208 See Joshua D. Angrist and Jörn-Steffen Pischke, Mostly Harmless Econometrics:
An Empiricist’s Companion 223 (Princeton 2009).
209 For example, some individuals may be more optimistic about their futures because they know something about themselves that the econometrician does not—such as
particular skills that are not measured—that would make their happiness levels higher.
Fixed effects can control for these general, unchanging characteristics.
210 Indeed, from 1971 to 2011, rates of homeownership in Britain increased from 50
to 64 percent. A Century of Home Ownership and Renting in England and Wales (Office
for National Statistics, Apr 19, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/5KJG-4EQH.
211 See René Böheim and Mark P. Taylor, Tied Down or Room to Move? Investigating the Relationships between Housing Tenure, Employment Status and Residential Mobility in Britain, 49 Scottish J Polit Econ 369, 383 (2002).
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similar reasons for moving break down in the case of longtime
homeowners compared to renters, and the longtime homeowners
may be moving to especially good opportunities given that they
chose to leave houses in which they had spent so much time.212
D. Legal Implications
The results derived from the BHPS data set provide support
for states adopting multipliers and for courts analyzing eminent
domain issues to consider a multiplier as consistent with the
Supreme Court’s guidance on just compensation.
1. Justifying a fair market value multiplier.
These results can be used to support an appropriate multiplier for the housing value that reflects the effect of an eminent
domain action on happiness. The more-conservative results
found in Model 2 imply that moving leads to, on average, a
0.0958 decrease in a homeowner’s well-being in the year after
the move relative to a renter’s well-being (on a scale from 1 to 7,
where the average life-satisfaction level is 5.21). Because Model
4 implies that, on average, the payment of an additional pound
increases happiness by 0.00000290 life-satisfaction points,213 an
individual would need to be compensated by £33,034 to be truly
“made whole.” After throwing out outliers at the bottom 5 percent and top 5 percent, the average value for owned housing in
the BHPS data set (reported by respondents as the price for
which they would expect to sell their home) is around £150,000.
Thus, moving from a home one owns relative to moving from a
home one rents implies an average decrease in happiness costing 22 percent of the estimated fair market value of the average
individual’s property in monetary terms.
212 Two other robustness checks that are not reflected in the above table were performed. The above table uses measurements of move effects for only three years, because
when a fourth move variable was added—which would have shown the effects on happiness
for four years from the date of the move—there was not a significant coefficient on that
term. Because Stata drops observations when there are missing values, adding that extra
year meant that the data set was smaller. Thus, this Comment reports the estimates for
only three years’ worth of effects on happiness with the appropriate lags. A lag of three
years is consistent with what Oswald and Powdthavee use in measuring the effects of disability. Oswald and Powdthavee, 92 J Pub Econ at 1068 (cited in note 77). In addition, the
time of year at which the person took the survey did not change the estimates on the variables of interest, so indicators for this variable have been left out of the regression.
213 This is the most conservative estimate, and it is also likely the most reliable one
because it begins to address the endogeneity problems associated with income.
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What are the implications of an accurate multiplier for the
current fair market value that is provided in the eminent domain context? Again, while the above results must be caveated
with the caution that strict assumptions have been made to allow identification, these results imply that the average person
subject to eminent domain is undercompensated by 22 percent of
the value of her property.
These results provide support for states that have adopted
nonzero multipliers. The estimate using the income coefficient in
the data implies that the states discussed in Part I.B with 25
percent multipliers—Connecticut and Michigan, as well as
Missouri (for “nonheritage homes”)—are in the right range given
the more conservative estimate, especially considering that the
22 percent multiplier does not yet include moving costs,214 which
can be reasonably estimated as exceeding an additional 3 percent.215 While Indiana, Missouri (for “heritage homes”), and
Rhode Island employ multipliers that exceed the 22 percent estimate, this estimate is a lower bound. Thus, it is possible that
higher multipliers offer compensation that is closer to the actual
average subjective valuation. This analysis provides support for
other states that have recognized the undercompensatory nature
of the fair market value standard by compensating relocation expenses, but that as of yet have been unwilling to use a multiplier.
In addition, this analysis provides an additional alternative to
the fair market value standard for courts that wish to follow the
Supreme Court’s requirements that an individual be “made
whole.”216 The Supreme Court endorsed a fair market value standard because of its workability, on the assumption that no other
workable standards existed.217 However, a 22 percent multiplier
based on this well-being analysis provides an estimate for the
214

See Part I.B.
An interstate household move alone has been estimated to cost $9,000, with closing costs on a new-home purchase estimated to be as high as “3 [percent] of the purchase
price” and survey evidence implying an average total transaction cost of 12 percent. John
M. Quigley, Transactions Costs and Housing Markets, in Tony O’Sullivan and Kenneth
Gibb, eds, Housing Economics and Public Policy 56, 59–60 (Blackwell Science 2003).
This is in addition to the possibility that minorities pay extra search costs in this process—one scholar has estimated that minorities may face a “discrimination tax” of approximately $3,000. Camille Zubrinsky Charles, The Dynamics of Racial Residential
Segregation, in J. Rosie Tighe and Elizabeth J. Mueller, eds, The Affordable Housing
Reader 499, 519 (Routledge 2013), citing John Yinger, Closed Doors, Opportunities Lost:
The Continuing Costs of Housing Discrimination 95–103 (Russell Sage 1995).
216 Olson, 292 US at 255. See also Part III.A–B.
217 See notes 39–41 and accompanying text.
215
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amount that needs to be paid to an individual—an amount that
can be “readily estimated”218 and that “has an external validity
which makes it a fair measure of public obligation to compensate.”219 For these reasons, it meets the workability criteria of
fair market value by estimating an owner’s subjective value of
her property. However, it has the extra benefit of, on average,
getting the subjective valuation correct in terms of meeting the
Supreme Court’s requirement of making the individual whole,
as opposed to the fair market value standard, which is guaranteed to undercompensate when legally applied.220 Thus, the conservative approach taken in calculating this multiplier provides
a basis for courts to begin compensating individuals with the
fair market value plus an additional 22 percent of that value to
satisfy the Fifth Amendment.
2. Addressing objections.
All multipliers, even ones that are rigorously pegged to an
average valuation, raise the concern of overcompensation, and
there are many authors who have rejected multipliers in part
due to such concerns.221 While the fair market value guarantees
that all individuals are undercompensated, a well-being-analysis
approach allows individuals with below-average subjective valuations to be overcompensated while still allowing individuals
with above-average subjective valuations to be undercompensated (just less so than the fair market value standard would
have allowed).222 Moreover, this raises the concern that individuals with below-average valuations will actively lobby for their

218

Boom Co v Patterson, 98 US (8 Otto) 403, 408 (1878).
Kimball Laundry, 338 US at 5.
220 See Parts I.A, II.A.1.
221 See, for example, Somin, The Grasping Hand at 207 (cited in note 56) (noting
that under a supra–fair market value approach, owners “might actually be overcompensated”); Fennell, 2004 Mich St L Rev at 993–94 (cited in note 38) (pointing out perverse
incentives when percentage bonuses exceed subjective valuations).
222 While the fact that some individuals are still undercompensated is also a criticism of the multiplier approach, these individuals are undercompensated less than they
would be under the fair market value standard, and thus a multiplier based on a wellbeing-analysis approach is an improvement in this respect. Absent a better alternative
that can meet the Court’s call for a workable estimate, this improvement supports adopting a multiplier based on a well-being-analysis approach.
219
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properties to be taken using eminent domain, as they will benefit from the overestimation that occurs with a multiplier.223
Neither of these criticisms is fatal to the use of a multiplier
derived from a well-being analysis. First, the fact that there is
some overcompensation is not necessarily worse than the status
quo, in which the legal standard leads ex ante to undercompensation. A true commitment to “making the individual whole”
requires being willing to occasionally overcompensate in order to
come closer to adequate compensation and, as demonstrated in
Part II.A.2, overcompensation can also encourage rent-seeking.
Assuming that individuals are symmetrically distributed around
the average subjective value for a given good with the same fair
market value, the expected error (that is to say, the deviation
from making the individual whole, either through over- or undercompensation) is minimized by using the average value rather
than the fair market value given the choice between the two,
and the disparity between these standards increases the more
that individuals are clumped closer together.224 Thus, while
there are deviations from the estimate of the economic value, a
well-estimated multiplier comes closer to getting individuals to
the make-whole amount required by the courts under certain
223 See Somin, The Grasping Hand at 207–09 (cited in note 56), citing Hawaii Housing Authority v Midkiff, 467 US 229, 233 (1984) (suggesting that this problem has occurred even with the fair market value standard).
224 This can also be shown mathematically. Assume that there are individuals with
four subjective valuations of properties with the same fair market values. Those subjective valuations are denoted by a, b, c, and d, and an individual with a valuation of i will
be denoted as Person i. Without loss of generality, let a ≤ b ≤ c ≤ d. The multiplier, if correctly estimated, will lead to a payment to each individual of (a + b + c + d) / 4, since that
is the average subjective value and the properties have the same fair market values.
This means that the error associated with individual a using the multiplier is
(a + b + c + d) / 4 − a: since Person a has a lower-than-average subjective valuation, she
is overpaid to the extent that the average subjective valuation is greater than her own.
Similarly, the error associated with Person b is (a + b + c + d) / 4 − b. Both Person c and
Person d are underpaid under the multiplier approach, and thus the errors associated
with their payments will be the extent to which their subjective valuations exceed the
payments they receive, which is c − (a + b + c + d) / 4 and d − (a + b + c + d) / 4, respectively. The sum of all of these individual errors is c + d − a − b, which is the total error
associated with the multiplier. Although the error associated with the fair market value
standard cannot be estimated without knowledge of the fair market value, a lower bound
for it can be calculated. The fair market value has to be less than or equal to a—otherwise
Person a would have sold. This means that the lower bound on the error associated with
the fair market value is (b − a) + (c − a) + (d − a) + (a − a) = b + c + d − 3a. Note that we can
rewrite the error associated with the multiplier as c + d − a − b = b + c + d − a − 2b in order
to compare the lower bound of the fair market value standard with the multiplier. Because
2a ≤ 2b, the multiplier must always do at least as well as the fair market value standard
and will do better as long as there is enough variation in the subjective values.
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distributions. Of course, with a rich data set, a well-being analysis has the potential to verify these distributions through quintile regressions, and thus its methodology can also be used to determine precisely how much a proposed multiplier reduces error.
Second, courts have two tools to protect against potential
abuses in response to overcompensation, and they can use these
doctrines to downwardly adjust the estimates in response to cases in which individuals lobby for their properties to be taken.
The first is the courts’ ability to adjust practical estimates when
doing so is required to avoid “manifest injustice.”225 When the
Fifth Amendment standard of fair market value “would result in
manifest injustice to owner or public, courts have fashioned and
applied other standards.”226 Because these standards can be invoked to protect the public,227 courts could police such lobbying
on the ground that it is part of a “manifest injustice” against taxpayers, and they could revert to the fair market value standard in
the case of individuals’ abuse of the higher standard. In addition,
there is currently a significant body of case law requiring that the
government engage in good faith bargaining,228 and this obligation
could be imposed on property owners if a risk of overcompensation were introduced. For example, because lobbying for eminent
domain action makes rejections of fair market value offers no
longer credible (the individual is actively seeking a buyer), this
adapted requirement could be used to deny individuals supra–fair
market value compensation through the eminent domain process.
Finally, a richer data set for a well-being analysis and its more
complex estimates would help mitigate the overcompensation
225

United States v Commodities Trading Corp, 339 US 121, 123 (1950).
Id.
227 Although they preceded the term “manifest injustice,” Olson as well as United
States v Miller, 317 US 369 (1943), are later cited as examples in which courts prevented
“manifest injustice” by adjusting fair market value at the time of the takings in order to
protect the purchaser. See notes 30, 44, and accompanying text. For an example of a
court actually invoking this standard to protect the purchaser, see Toledo, Peoria &
Western Railway v Surface Transportation Board, 462 F3d 734, 747 (7th Cir 2006) (accepting an averaged price for compensation, because “the inflated prices of steel on the
date of final sale and on the date of appropriation meant that market value on those
dates . . . did not represent the fair market value of [Toledo, Peoria & Western Railway’s]
assets and would result in ‘manifest injustice’ to the purchaser”).
228 See, for example, Garnett, 105 Mich L Rev at 129 & n 170 (cited in note 111);
Krupicka v Village of Dorchester, 804 NW2d 37, 49 (Neb App 2011) (upholding the trial
court’s finding that the condemnor had met the Nebraska statute’s good faith negotiation
requirement); Valleybrook Developers, Inc v Gulf Power Co, 272 S2d 167, 169 (Fla App
1973) (reversing the district court’s finding that there was insufficient evidence of good
faith estimation in a taking).
226
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concern. Such a data set would provide an opportunity to tailor
the estimate to individual characteristics by interacting individual characteristics with the variable indicating that the individual
was subject to an eminent domain action. For example, the analysis could provide a separate multiplier for individuals who have
lived in homes for five years in comparison to ten years, and it
could provide a separate multiplier for individuals with small
families in comparison to large ones. This requires answering difficult questions about the role of statistical analyses in treating
individuals differently; however, as these estimates become more
accurate, it will become more difficult for individuals to get an adjusted compensation that is actually above the economic value
compensation. In addition, these estimates allow governments to
target those who have lower subjective valuations, helping to alleviate allocative-efficiency concerns.
CONCLUSION
This Comment provides an argument for applying a wellbeing-analysis approach to eminent domain compensation, discussing the inefficiencies that result from compensating individuals with only the fair market value of their properties and
arguing that a well-being-analysis approach provides a way out
of the practical compromises made in eminent domain jurisprudence. Although happiness regressions do not demonstrate
the exact valuation that an individual has of her property, using
a multiplier that reflects the average subjective premium generated by a happiness regression is consistent with value-of-life
evidence, which uses information about others to estimate an
average multiplier that ensures more-accurate damages.
This Comment demonstrates that the BHPS data set, along
with certain assumptions about why individuals move, implies that
a wedge exists between the subjective valuation of an owned property and its fair market value. Not only does this wedge exist but it
measures somewhere around or above 22 percent of fair market
value. Given such a potentially large effect, this Comment aims to
inspire future survey work with respect to individuals who are required to move. Such survey data would measure changes in happiness when the move—since it is due to eminent domain—is exogenous. For this reason, regression analyses based on such moves
will provide even more-accurate estimates for the average undercompensation that occurs when individuals are paid only the fair
market value of their properties in the context of eminent domain.

